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Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions for a qualitative probability (Bernstein, 1917;
de Finetti, 1937; Koopman, 1940; Savage, 1954) that satisfies monotone continuity
(Villegas, 1964; Arrow, 1970) to have a unique countably additive measure represen-
tation, generalizing Villegas (1964) to allow atoms. Unlike previous contributions,
we do so without a cancellation or solvability axiom.
First, we establish that when atoms contain singleton cores, unlikely cores—the
requirement that the union of all cores is not more likely than its complement—is
sufficient (Theorem 3). Second, we establish that strict third-order atom-swarming—
the requirement that for each atom A, the less-likely non-null events are (in an ordi-
nal sense) more than three times as likely as A—is also sufficient (Theorem 5). This
latter result applies to intertemporal preferences over streams of indivisible objects.
Keywords: beliefs, qualitative probability, atoms, atom-swarming.
1 Introduction
1.1 Executive summary
From the doctor’s choice of treatment, to the employer’s choice of job applicant, to
the investor’s choice of portfolio, to the mortal’s choice of religion, and beyond: much
behavior, including much of the economic behavior we observe and strive to model, is the
selection of an action with uncertain consequences. Our standard model is founded on the
postulate that such choices, when made by someone who is rational, can be decomposed
into (1) beliefs about the relative likelihood of events, and (2) tastes among outcomes
(Ramsey, 1931). This article revisits a classic question: when are such beliefs consistent
with standard probability theory?1
*I thank David Ahn, Paulo Barelli, Marcus Berliant, David Dillenberger, Georgios Gerasimou, Itzhak
Gilboa, Srihari Govindan, Edward Green, Faruk Gul, Vilmos Komornik, Igor Kopylov, Massimo Mari-
nacci, Kemal Ozbek, Jacob Sagi, Oscar Sheynin, Tomasz Strzalecki, William Thomson, Peter Wakker,
Chih-Chun Yang, participants at the 2016 Canadian Economic Theory Conference and the 2016 RUD
(Research, Uncertainty, and Decision) Conference, and especially Asen Kochov, Ran Spiegler, and two
anonymous referees.
1Machina and Schmeidler (1992) call this question the first of two lines of inquiry culminating in the
modern theory of subjective probability.
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More precisely, suppose we are given a nonempty set of states S, a σ-algebra of events
A ⊆ 2S with S ∈ A, and a qualitative probability % on A: a binary relation on A,
consisting of comparisons of events on the basis of relative likelihood, satisfying minimal
probabilistic requirements (Bernstein, 1917; de Finetti, 1937; Koopman, 1940; Savage,
1954). When does % admit representation by a σ-measure2 µ : A → [0, 1]?
A necessary condition is monotone continuity (Villegas, 1964; Arrow, 1970): if B1 ⊇
B2 ⊇ ..., and for each i ∈ N , Bi % A, then ∩Bi % A.3 On the appeal of this axiom, Arrow
writes: “The assumption of Monotone Continuity seems, I believe correctly, to be the
harmless simplification almost inevitable in the formalization of any real-life problem.”
While this continuity axiom is not sufficient on its own (Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg,
1959), we obtain sufficient conditions when it is paired with the requirement that there are
no atoms: non-null events for which each subset is either equally-likely or null (Villegas,
1964).
Though the practice of using σ-measures to represent beliefs with atoms is preva-
lent throughout economic analysis (particularly when the state space is discrete), atoms
present non-trivial technical challenges for our problem. In fact, the large literature
dedicated to our problem can be classified according to which of the following is imposed:
• there are no atoms;
• the qualitative probability satisfies a “cancellation” axiom;
• the qualitative probability satisfies a “solvability” axiom; or
• there are additional primitives beyond S, A, and %.
The contribution of this article is to proceed without imposing any of the above.
First, we show that under monotone continuity, if each atom contains a core—a sin-
gleton atom—and if moreover the union of all cores is at most as likely as its complement,
then unique σ-measure representation is guaranteed (Theorem 3). In this case, there is
an infinitely-divisible event whose probability is at least one-half.
What if each infinitely-divisible event is less likely than its complement? In particular,
what if there are no infinitely-divisible events at all? To address this case, we propose
strict third-order atom-swarming (3+-AS): if there are any atoms at all, then each is suf-
ficiently overwhelmed by less-likely non-null events.4 Formally, for each atom A, there
is a pairwise-disjoint collection of less-likely non-null events that can be partitioned into
three5 subcollections, with the union of each more likely than A (Figure 1). Our main
result is that monotone continuity and 3+-AS are sufficient to guarantee σ-measure rep-
resentation.
2In this article, a measure is a finitely-additive probability measure, σ-additivity is countable-additivity,
and a σ-measure is a σ-additive measure.
3Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970) give different statements that are logically equivalent; I owe this
particularly elegant statement to a referee.
4Earlier versions of this article further required that these non-null events were in fact atoms, ruling out
the possibility of a finite collection of cores. I am indebted to a referee for suggesting this generalization.
5Why three? Why not the analogous 1+-AS or 2+-AS? This is addressed over the course of our
proof’s explanation. For now, we remark only that at least three has appeared in earlier research on
a similar topic: given an ordering over a product space, if there are only two “essential” factors, an
additional condition is used to guarantee an additive representation (Debreu, 1959). For rough intuition:
while addition is a binary operation, its cancellation property is articulated with three elements.
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Figure 1: Strict third-order atom-swarming. In the illustration, each gray circle is a
non-null event, and a more likely event has a greater area. The center event is an atom,
and the smaller events are pairwise-disjoint. Each dashed circle shows a collection of
these smaller events whose union is more likely than the center atom; in this way, the
atom is ‘sufficiently swarmed’ by the smaller events. The top collection includes a few
relatively large events, the rightmost collection includes many relatively small events, and
the leftmost collection includes events of different sizes. Not pictured, but allowed, is an
infinite collection of events. The axiom requires that there are three such collections for
each atom.
1.2 Related literature
According to the historian of probability Oscar Sheynin (Sheynin, 2005), Boole was the
first to call for an axiomatic foundation for probability,6 and this call was prominently
reiterated over four decades later in Hilbert’s Sixth Problem.7 It would be another three
decades before Kolmogorov provided today’s standard axioms for cardinal probability,
explaining that this task was “a rather hopeless one before the introduction of Lebesgue’s
theories of measure and integration” (Kolmogoroff, 1933). Kolmogorov’s axioms involve
σ-algebras, which are appropriately a subclass of the logical algebras studied by Boole:
anticipating Kolmogorov, Boole wrote that “the theory of probabilities is coextensive
with that of logic” because “as simple events are expressed by simple propositions, so
combinations of events are expressed by compound propositions” (Boole, 1851).8
6From Boole (1854): “It cannot, I think, be doubtful that the theory of probabilities belongs to that
class of sciences which are termed pure sciences[ . . . ]From this idea, from the definition of the measure of
probability by which it becomes associated with a number, and from the laws of thought with which it
is connected through its having to do with events capable of logical expression, flow the axioms and first
principles of the science[ . . . ]I go on to observe, that such principles, if truly axiomatic, lead in every pure
science, and therefore in the theory of probabilities, to a developed system of truth, or of methods for
the attainment of truth, which possess certain invariable characteristics never found unimpaired where
error has been permitted to enter.”
7From Hilbert (1900): “The investigations on the foundations of geometry suggest the problem: to
treat in the same manner, by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which mathematics plays
an important part; in the first rank are the theory of probabilities and mechanics.” The investigations
Hilbert refers to constitute the earliest axiomatic work in science that survives to this day (Euclid, circa
300 BC).
8Indeed, the modern notion of an abstract Boolean algebra (Halmos, 1963) involves ‘propositions’
that, by Stone’s Representation Theorem, can be viewed as events of a state space without loss of
generality (Birkhoff, 1935; Stone, 1936). This is not true for σ-algebras; the lost generality is made
explicit by the Loomis-Sikorski Representation Theorem (Loomis, 1947; Sikorski, 1960). Interestingly,
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This intimate relationship between logic and probability does not, however, require a
cardinal concept. Indeed, while a cardinal concept is natural for a frequentist interpreta-
tion of probability, in which “a probability is the relative frequency of some kind of event
in a certain type of sequence of events or, according to some, in a set of events” (Savage,
1961), this interpretation is rejected by Bayesian statisticians, who advocate reaction to
evidence using Bayes’ Theorem (Bayes, 1763).9
An alternative to frequentist probability, favored by many Bayesians, is a subjective
(or personal) interpretation of probability (Ramsey, 1931), and perhaps the most nat-
ural concept for this interpretation is not cardinal, but ordinal: when confronted with
two logical propositions whose truth is not known, one is able to compare the two, as
though using a balance, to form a belief about their relative likelihood. In fact, Bernstein
axiomatically pursued just such a concept even before Kolmogorov (Bernstein, 1917)!10
This article’s question is one of harmony: when do the concepts of cardinal prob-
abilities and ordinal beliefs coincide? When is it as though instead of comparing two
propositions with a balance, one instead compares them using a scale; first weighing the
first proposition, then weighing the second, and finally comparing the two weights? What
assumptions, exactly, are we making when we model someone’s beliefs with a probability
measure? We categorize the previous literature dedicated to this question by which of
four assertions is imposed, emphasizing that our contribution is to proceed without any
of these assertions.
The literature with no atoms
The seminal contributions to the qualitative probability literature (Bernstein, 1917;
de Finetti, 1937; Koopman, 1940) imposed that S can be partitioned into an arbitrarily
large number of equally likely events. This implies that there is a unique measure that
“almost represents” %, though it may assign the same probability to two distinguished
events (see Kreps, 1988).
To guarantee representation, Savage (1954) imposed a stronger axiom, fineness-and-
tightness, which moreover implies that the representation’s range is [0, 1].11 Surprisingly,
while Stone’s result relies on the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem, which is weaker than the Axiom of
Choice (Halpern and Le´vy, 1964), the result of Loomis and Sikorski does not (Buskes, de Pagter, and
van Rooij, 2008), nor does the fact that no generality is lost for finite algebras (Birkhoff, 1937).
9As Savage (1961) explains: “Whatever else a frequentist may do with the results of an investigation
he cannot, as a frequentist, use them to calculate probabilities of the uncertain propositions that are
under investigation. Technically, this means that he is cut off from most applications of Bayes’ theorem,
the algorithm for calculating what the new probability of a proposition is on the basis of its original
probability and new relevant evidence. One’s natural inclination to ask, ‘To what degree of conviction
does this new data entitle me?’ usually must be, and has been, regarded as a nonsense question by
the frequentist. The frequentist is required, therefore, to seek a concept of evidence, and of reaction to
evidence, different from that of the primitive, or natural, concept that is tantamount to application of
Bayes’ theorem.”
10At the time, Bernstein’s work was not well-known outside of Russia, and today the independent
works of de Finetti and Koopman remain better-known (de Finetti, 1937; Koopman, 1940). Slutsky
(1922) is another important Russian contribution toward axiomatic probability from this time; citing it
in his obituary of Slutsky, Kolmogorov (1948) remarked that Slutsky “was the first to draw a correct
picture of the purely mathematical essence of probability theory.” Slutsky (1925), in turn, remarked:
“Regrettably, in 1922 I was not acquainted with Bernstein (1917) where the indicated ideas had already
been realized, and more formally at that. That contribution deserves to be most seriously studied.” See
Sheynin (2010) for a discussion, and see Sheynin (2005) for a translation of Bernstein (1917).
11For simplicity of presentation, Savage further imposed that A = 2S , but his analysis is valid if A
is any σ-algebra (Wakker, 1981; Wakker, 1993a). If A is only required to be an algebra and a weaker
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Savage’s axioms are in fact compatible when |S| = |N|; they are only incompatible when
S is finite (Kreps, 1988; Wakker, 1993a). That said, Savage’s axioms are incompatible
with atoms, and they are incompatible with σ-additivity when |S| = |N|.12
Savage deliberately avoided any continuity axiom implying σ-additivity, explaining:
“I know of no argument leading to the requirement of countable additivity[ . . . ]it therefore
seems better not to assume countable additivity outright as a postulate, but to recognize
it as a special hypothesis yielding, where applicable, a large class of useful theorems.”
But there have since been two particularly strong such arguments: first, σ-additivity is
required for avoiding money pumps (Adams, 1962; Seidenfeld and Schervish, 1983), and
second, σ-additivity is required to ensure that choice always respects strict first order
stochastic dominance (Wakker, 1993b). Based on these observations and others, Stinch-
combe (1997) argues that a measure which is only finitely-additive indicates a misspecified
state space: “One summary[ . . . ]is that countably infinite constructions require countably
additive probabilities.”
Villegas (1964) identified the appropriate continuity axiom: if µ is a measure repre-
sentation of %, then µ is a σ-additive if and only if % is monotonely continuous (Theo-
rem V1). Furthermore, (i) monotone continuity, and (ii) the requirement that there are
no atoms, are sufficient for σ-measure representation (Theorem V2). We appeal to these
important results directly in our proof. Unfortunately, these axioms are incompatible
when |S| ≤ |N|.
While Kopylov (2010) does not explicitly study qualitative probabilities, it is clear
from his analysis that σ-measure representation is guaranteed by imposing only strong
monotone continuity when A is countably separated (Mackey, 1957). That there are no
atoms is then implied. Because Kopylov’s axioms are incompatible when |S| ≤ |N|, and
because A can only be countably separated when |S| ≤ |R|,13 it follows that under the
Continuum Hypothesis, this approach is custom-tailored to the case where |S| = |R|.
Our results generalize that of Villegas (1964) by weakening the requirement that there
are no atoms. Like Savage (1954), our axioms are incompatible only when S is finite.
Unlike the rest of this part of the literature, our results are compatible with atoms, and
with σ-additivity whenever S is infinite.
The literature with cancellation
Even when S is finite, there are qualitative probabilities without measure represen-
tations (Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg, 1959). This was first demonstrated by means of
version of fineness-and-tightness is imposed, then a measure representation is still guaranteed (Wakker,
1981), but its range need only be a dense subset of [0, 1] (Marinacci, 1993). While there are indeed
such atomless measures without convex range (Nunke and Savage, 1952), every atomless σ-measure has
convex range (see Halmos, 1947, Lemma 2).
12Savage’s simplifying assumption that A = 2S seriously restricts compatibility with σ-additivity. If
|S| = |R|, then the existence of an atomless σ-measure defined on 2S is inconsistent with the Continuum
Hypothesis (Banach and Kuratowski, 1929; Ulam, 1930). Savage avoids this issue by relaxing σ-additivity,
as there are well-behaved atomless measures—for example when S = [0, 1], there are measures that
(1) agree with the Lebesgue measure on those sets where it is defined, and (2) assign the same number
to any pair of congruent sets (Banach, 1932). By contrast, we avoid this issue both by allowing A to be
any σ-algebra and by allowing atoms.
13A is countable separated if there is a countable collection of events A∗ ⊆ A such that for each distinct
pair s, s′ ∈ S, there is A ∈ A∗ with s ∈ A and s′ 6∈ A. That this implies |S| ≤ |R| can be seen from the
following argument of Faris (2007): index A∗ by the natural numbers, so that A∗ = {A1, A2, ...}, and
define the mapping ϕ from S to the Cantor set C (Cantor, 1883) by defining, for each i ∈ N and each
s ∈ S, ϕi(s) ≡ 1Ai(s). Then ϕ is an injection, so |S| ≤ |C| = |R|.
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a qualitative probability % on the subsets of {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} that includes the compar-
isons:
(1) { s1 } % { s2, s4 }
(2) { s3, s4 } % { s1, s2, }
(3) { s2, s5 } % { s1, s4 }
(4) { s1, s2, s4 }  { s3, s5 }
A necessary and sufficient condition for measure representation is finite cancellation
(Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg, 1959; Scott, 1964; Fishburn, 1970; Krantz, Luce, Suppes,
and Tversky, 1971), the assertion that there is no such list of comparisons. This condi-
tion is quite strong, alone necessary and sufficient for additive representation (Fishburn,
1970). Attempts to justify this axiom generally rely on enriched models—for example,
preferences over multi-sets of states, where such a multi-set is interpreted as a portfolio
of Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie securities—and as such it can be difficult to interpret.
Stronger and more complex conditions have been identified that guarantee measure
representation while allowing atoms when S is infinite (Domotor, 1969; Chateauneuf
and Jaffray, 1984; Chateauneuf, 1985). Chateauneuf (1985) in fact provides necessary
and sufficient conditions using an axiom that implies finite cancellation. We recommend
Fishburn’s survey for more information (Fishburn, 1986).
By contrast, we do not impose any cancellation axiom. For the purely discrete case,
we instead follow Cantor and Debreu (Cantor, 1895; Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1964) by con-
structing an order-dense family of equivalence classes. We then define a binary operation
on this family and, following Peano (1889), show that this binary operation interacts ap-
propriately with succession—that is, addition by one—from which we derive cancellation,
commutativity, associativity, and all other properties of ordinary addition.
The literature with solvability
To our knowledge, there are two articles studying qualitative probabilities with atoms
that do not impose cancellation (Abdellaoui and Wakker, 2005; Chew and Sagi, 2006).
Both approaches involve solvability:14 for each pair of disjoint events, there is a subevent
of one that is as likely as the other. Abdellaoui and Wakker (2005) allow for mosaics
instead of σ-algebras and allow for measures that are not convex-ranged, while Chew and
Sagi (2006) work with an ordering of events induced from preferences over acts through
“exchangeability” and proceed without monotonicity. In both cases there may be atoms,
provided any pairwise disjoint collection of atoms is finite with equally-likely members.
By contrast, our results are compatible with an ‘exhaustive’ pairwise disjoint collection
of atoms which is finite or infinite, and moreover, the atoms need not be equally-likely.
For the discrete case, we explain the difference in approach with a visual metaphor where
size corresponds to likelihood. Given two events, one larger than the other, we would
often like to find a piece of the larger that is the same size as the smaller. In the solvability
approach, the larger event is made of a fabric from which the desired piece can be cleanly
cut. In our approach, we cannot always create the desired piece because the larger event
14This is not quite the language used in either article. Abdellaoui and Wakker (2005) use “solvability”
to refer to a stronger axiom, while Chew and Sagi (2006) use “completeness” to refer to the given axiom
and use “solvability” to refer to a related property for measures.
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may consist of blocks that cannot be cut. Nevertheless, whenever the larger event has a
rich enough composition, the desired piece can be mosaicked by iteratively adding smaller
and smaller blocks to better-approximate the specified size.
The literature with additional primitives
We refer to works that use the entire Savage (1954) model: a state space S, an outcome
space X, and preferences over acts f : S → X. Often implicitly, A = 2S. To uncover
the embedded qualitative probability, first select a pair of outcomes x∗ and x such that
the act guaranteeing x∗ is preferred to that guaranteeing x. Beliefs can then be defined
as preferences among simple bets: A % B if and only if the act returning x∗ on A and
x otherwise is at least as desirable as the act returning x∗ on B and x otherwise. It is
imposed that this is well-defined; % does depend on the choice of x∗ and x.
Savage used only % to deliver the unique measure representation of beliefs. But
to handle atoms that are not equally likely without using a cancellation or solvability
axiom, others have used the entire model, particularly when S is discrete. Typically
this involves imposing, at a minimum, that X has cardinality of at least the continuum
and that X has a rich topological structure. For example, X might be a simplex of
objective “roulette lotteries” that can be mixed (as in Anscombe and Aumann, 1963 and
the vast literature that followed), or an interval of dollar amounts (see Wakker, 1989;
Gul, 1992; and references therein), or Euclidean commodity space (as in the literature on
intertemporal preferences, for example Koopmans, 1960).
In contrast to those who use the full Savage model under the uncertainty interpre-
tation, we do not rely on any extraneous assumptions about some space of outcomes
to deliver the measure representation, keeping our analysis firmly focused on beliefs.
In contrast to most studies of intertemporal preference, our approach allows for finite
consumption spaces; we revisit this point in the Conclusion.
1.3 Outline
In Section 2, we provide the model and formally state our five theorems. We first define
(ordinal) qualitative probability, (cardinal) quantitative probability, and representation
of the former by the latter, then formally state our main result (Theorem 5). We then
introduce catalogued spaces where each atom has a singleton core, and formally state the
other four theorems.
The next four sections are dedicated to the techniques involved in the proof of Theo-
rem 5. (Structurally, Theorem 3 is one of many lemmas in this proof.) In particular:
• Section 3 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 1, which states that monotone
continuity and 3-AS guarantee σ-measure representation for the discrete catalogued
spaces, where |S| = |N| and each singleton is a core. The overall strategy is to
construct a particular kind of order-dense family of equivalence classes called a
supercabinet; some of the key techniques involve viewing the events as members of
the Cantor set, constructing specified events using a greedy algorithm, and verifying
addition axioms similar to Peano’s for a particular binary operation.
• Section 4 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2, which states that monotone
continuity and 3-AS guarantee σ-measure representation for catalogued spaces with
a finite number of cores. The proof involves partitioning an infinitely-divisible event
into ‘honorary cores’ and applying the techniques from the previous section.
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• Section 5 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 4, which states that monotone conti-
nuity and 3+-AS guarantee σ-measure representation for the remaining catalogued
spaces, where there is a messy sequence of cores together with some infinitely-
divisible events. One of the key lemmas is Theorem 3, which states that monotone
continuity and unlikely cores guarantee σ-measure representation. Constructing the
σ-measure involves repeatedly splitting the space into a left space and a right space,
then applying Theorem 2 to the former and Theorem 3 to the latter. Verifying
that the σ-measure is in fact a representation involves an algorithm that takes as
input an arbitrary pair of events A and B, and returns as output a finite sequence
of event pairs, allowing the statement “A % B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B)” to be
directly proved.
• Section 6 briefly describes how Theorem 5 is established by the above results.
Finally, Section 7 concludes by discussing two alternative settings where our results are
relevant: preferences over parts of a heterogeneous good and preferences over consumption
streams.
2 Model and main results
2.1 Qualitative probability
A likelihood space (S,A,%) is a triple consisting of
(1) a set of states S with generic members s, s′,
(2) a σ-algebra of events A ⊆ 2S, including S, with generic members A,B,C,15 and
(3) a likelihood relation %, which is a binary relation on A.
We interpret % as a collection of comparisons of events on the basis of relative likelihood:
A % B denotes “A is at least as likely as B.” We write A ∼ B to denote A % B and
B % A, and write A  B to denote A % B but not A ∼ B. We emphasize that, for
convenience, we include degenerate triples (∅, {∅},%) as likelihood spaces.
Formally, all our results concern likelihood spaces. That said, we often implicitly take
S and A as the set of states and σ-algebra, respectively, abusing notation by referring
to the likelihood space by its likelihood relation. In certain cases, we are instead explicit
about the entire likelihood space, particularly when comparing several likelihood spaces
or when imposing structure on the set of states and σ-algebra.
The following assumptions are standard:
◦ Order:16 The relation % is complete and transitive.
15Savage (1954) is less general, asserting that A = 2S , while others are more general, allowing A to
be any “abstract” σ-algebra (Villegas, 1964; Villegas, 1967), or any algebra (Wakker, 1981; Marinacci,
1993), or any mosaic (Kopylov, 2007; Abdellaoui and Wakker, 2005). This last generalization is motivated
by the distinction between “risk” and “ambiguity” (Knight, 1921) illustrated by the Ellsberg paradox
(Ellsberg, 1961), as the collection of “subjectively risky events” (Epstein and Zhang, 2001) need only be
a mosaic.
16The standard assumption of completeness—that comparisons are always possible—has been criti-
cized on both normative and positive grounds (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Aumann, 1962;
Schmeidler, 1989; Mandler, 2005). Indecisiveness can be observed and distinguished from indifference
(Eliaz and Ok, 2006), and in fact has been in a recent experiment (Cettolin and Riedl, 2013). Recently,
likelihood relations have been considered without completeness, and in particular, axiomatic foundations
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◦ Separability:17 For each triple A,B,C ∈ A such that A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅,
A % B if and only if A ∪ C % B ∪ C.
◦ Monotonicity: For each pair A,B ∈ A, A ⊆ B implies B % A.
◦ Nondegeneracy: There are A,B ∈ A such that A  B.
We gather these standard assumptions in the following definition:
Definition: A qualitative probability space is a likelihood space that satisfies order,
separability, monotonicity, and nondegeneracy. A qualitative probability is the likelihood
relation of a qualitative probability space.18
2.2 Quantitative probability
We seek conditions under which our ordinal notion of qualitative probability space coin-
cides with the standard cardinal notion of (quantitative) probability space (Kolmogoroff,
1933). The cardinal notion is that of a probability measure:
Definition: A function µ : A → [0, 1] is a measure if
(1) µ(S) = 1, and
(2) for each finite, pairwise disjoint collection {Ai}i∈I ⊆ A,
µ(∪Ai) =
∑
µ(Ai).
A measure µ is moreover a σ-measure if
(3) for each countably infinite, pairwise disjoint collection {Ai}i∈I ⊆ A,
µ(∪Ai) =
∑
µ(Ai).
Let M(A) ⊆ [0, 1]A denote the set of measures and let Mσ(A) ⊆M(A) denote the set
of σ-measures.
We say that the ordinal and cardinal notions coincide when the measure represents
likelihood comparisons:
Definition: If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space and µ ∈ M(A), then we say
µ is a representation of (S,A,%) if for each pair A,B ∈ A,
A % B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B).
In this case we say µ represents %.
for representation by multiple prior probability measures—where a first event is more likely than a second
if and only if each prior assigns a higher probability to the first—have been provided, both when each
event can be partitioned into two equally-likely subevents (Nehring, 2009) and more generally through
the use of a cancellation axiom (Alon and Lehrer, 2014).
17We note that when likelihood relations are interpreted as observable preferences among bets, the
systematic violation of this axiom has been observed in an experiment where certain events are attached
to probability appraisals while others are not (Ellsberg, 1961); the favoring of the appraised events is a
phenomenon typically ascribed to ambiguity aversion (though not always; see Ergin and Gul, 2009).
18Savage (1954) and others give an equivalent definition using a weaker version of monotonicity and a
stronger version of nondegeneracy.
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2.3 The main result
As argued in Section 1.1, there are strong reasons to impose that the measure repre-
sentation is σ-additive (Adams, 1962; Seidenfeld and Schervish, 1983; Wakker, 1993b;
Stinchcombe, 1997), and the appropriate axiom for doing so has been identified:19
◦ Monotone continuity (Villegas, 1964): For each A ∈ A and each (Bi) ∈ AN, if
(i) B1 ⊇ B2 ⊇ ..., and
(ii) for each i ∈ N, Bi % A,
then ∩Bi % A.
Theorem V1 (Villegas, 1964): If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space with
representation µ ∈ M(A), then (S,A,%) satisfies monotone continuity if and only if
µ ∈Mσ(A).
We therefore impose monotone continuity, whose implications are understood when
there are no ‘atoms,’ or events whose less-likely subevents are null:
Definition: An atom is an event A ∈ A such that
(1) A  ∅, and
(2) for each B ⊆ A, either B ∼ A or B ∼ ∅.
We write Aα ⊆ A for the collection of atoms.
In particular, when there are no atoms, monotone continuity guarantees a unique
representation by a special kind of measure:
Definition: A measure µ ∈ M(A) is infinitely-divisible if for each A ∈ A and each
λ ∈ [0, 1], there is B ⊆ A such that µ(B) = λµ(A).
Theorem V2 (Villegas, 1964): If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space sat-
isfying monotone continuity such that Aα = ∅, then it has a unique representation
µ ∈Mσ(A). Moreoever, µ is infinitely-divisible.
In this article, we generalize Theorem V2 by allowing atoms. To do so, we introduce a
parametric family of atom-swarming axioms, with higher-parameter assumptions logically
stronger than lower-parameter ones. Formally, for each A ∈ A, let (↓ A) denote the
collection of non-null events that are less likely than A:
(↓ A) ≡ {A′ ∈ A|A  A′  ∅}.
For each k ∈ N, we define the axiom that for each atom A, ∪(↓ A) is, in an ordinal
sense, k times as likely as A:
◦ kth-order atom-swarming (k-AS): For each A ∈ Aα, there are
(i) pairwise-disjoint B ⊆ (↓ A), and
19In fact, this is the appropriate axiom even in the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1989), guaranteeing that the set of priors is a relatively weak compact set of σ-measures (Chateauneuf,
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Tallon, 2005).
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(ii) B1,B2, ...,Bk ⊆ B partitioning B,
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, (∪Bi) % A.
If furthermore, for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, (∪Bi)  A, then strict kth-order atom-
swarming, or k+-AS, is satisfied.
As promised, higher-indexed axioms are logically stronger. Note that under monotone
continuity, any pairwise-disjoint collection of non-null events B is countable, so if Bi is a
subcollection of some such B, then (∪Bi) is an event.
Our main result is that σ-representation is guaranteed by monotone continuity and
3+-AS:
Theorem 5: A triple (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space satisfying monotone
continuity and 3+-AS if and only if it has a unique representation µ ∈ Mσ(A) such that
for each A ∈ A,
(i) if A is an atom, µ(∪(↓ A)) > 3µ(A) > 0, and
(ii) if A contains no atoms, for each λ ∈ [0, 1], there is B ⊆ A such that µ(B) = λµ(A).
2.4 Catalogued spaces and other results
Working with atoms involves some nuance: two distinct atoms can have non-empty in-
tersection; in fact, one atom can even be contained in another. This makes it tempting to
consider only ‘smallest’ atoms: for each atom, take the collection of its non-null subevents
(which are themselves atoms), then take the intersection of this collection. The problem
is that in general, this collection need not be countable, and therefore this intersection
need not be an event.
We suppress the above nuance for most of the analysis by asserting that each atom
contains a core, or a singleton atom, and do so by working with the following class of
qualitative probability spaces:
Definition: A qualitative probability space (S,A,%) is catalogued if there is S⊕ ⊆ S
such that
(1) either
(i) S⊕ = ∅,
(ii) there is m ∈ N such that S⊕ = {1, 2, ...,m}, or
(iii) S⊕ = N,
(2) for each s ∈ S⊕, {s} ∈ Aα,
(3) for each A ⊆ S\S⊕, A 6∈ Aα, and
(4) for each pair s, s′ ∈ S⊕, s < s′ implies {s} % {s′}.
We let A⊕ denote 2S⊕ , we let S◦ denote S\S⊕, and we let A◦ denote A ∩ 2S◦ . We say
that (S,A,%) is
• purely-σ-catalogued if S⊕ = S = N,
• finitely-catalogued if S⊕ 6= N, and
• σ-catalogued if S⊕ = N.
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Figure 2: The results and their relationships. There is an arrow from a first result to
a second if the first result is used at some point in the proof of the second. Blue results
are due to others, green results are theorems, and the main result is Theorem 5.
Thus in a catalogued space, each atom has a core {s} , where s ∈ S⊕. Moreover, these
singletons are labeled by consecutive natural numbers so that {1} % {2} % ..., which will
frequently be convenient.
We provide another generalization of Theorem V2 for catalogued spaces, using the
requirements that the cores are not more likely than their complement:
◦ Unlikely cores: A catalogued probability space satisfies the axiom if S◦ % S⊕.
Theorem 3: If (S,A,%) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying mono-
tone continuity and unlikely cores, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Structurally, the other three theorems are the supporting pillars of Theorem 5, and
the next three sections are dedicated to explaining their proofs. Theorem 1, Theorem 2,
and Theorem 4 each provide sufficient conditions for σ-measure representation of cer-
tain catalogued spaces—in particular, for purely-σ-catalogued spaces, finitely-catalogued
spaces, and σ-catalogued spaces, respectively:
Theorem 1: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
monotone continuity and 3-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Theorem 2: If (S,A,%) is a finitely-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
monotone continuity and 3-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Theorem 4: If (S,A,%) is a σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying mono-
tone continuity and 3+-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
The theorems are numbered according to the sequence they are proved in the following
sections. For a schematic of the overall proof structure, see Figure 2.
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3 Proof sketch for Theorem 1
3.1 Supercabinet blueprint
We begin by investigating purely σ-catalogued probability spaces: S is the natural num-
bers; A is its power set; and the singletons are the cores, which are labeled in non-
increasing order of likelihood. For both cardinal and ordinal purposes, it is fruitful to
consider A with the topology of pointwise convergence: for measures, σ-additivity is
equivalent to continuity (with this topology), while for qualitative probabilities, monotone
continuity is equivalent to closure of upper and lower contour sets (with this topology).20
We can thus restate our objective: we seek to prove that there is a continuous repre-
sentation of % that is moreover a measure. A first step might be to establish that there
is some continuous representation, and toward this end it is helpful to recall a classic
result from the utility function literature, Theorem CD (Cantor, 1895; Debreu, 1954;
Debreu, 1964). This theorem involves a structured family of equivalence classes, which I
will suggestively refer to as a cabinet.21
Definition: For each qualitative probability space (S,A,%), a collection of equivalence
classes {Zi}i∈N ⊆ [A/∼] is a cabinet of (S,A,%) if for each pair A,B ∈ A such that
A  B, there is Z ∈ ∪Zi such that A % Z % B.
A cabinet can be thought of as a collection of drawers labeled 1, 2, 3, ..., each drawer
filed with equally-likely events. The requirement is that if I give a file clerk two events A
and B, one more likely than the other, then he should be able to go to the cabinet, open
one of the drawers, and retrieve some event Z that is between A and B in likelihood.
Theorem CD states that if we can construct such a cabinet, then we are promised a
continuous representation:
Theorem CD (Cantor, 1895; Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1964):22 If (i) (S,A,%)
has a cabinet, and (ii) % has closed upper and lower contour sets, then there is continuous
u : A → R such that
u(A) ≥ u(B)⇔ A % B.
For our objective, we do not want just any continuous representation; we want one
that is moreover a measure, taking into account the algebraic structure of the events. We
therefore do not want just any cabinet; we want one that moreover takes into account
the algebraic structure of the events. What I propose is that we first repaint the cabinet,
labeling the drawers not with 1, 2, 3, ..., but rather in anticipation of probabilities: let v
20I was unable to find a reference for either of these observations, though I would not be surprised if
they are already known, especially the former.
21This pedagogical device was inspired by a recorded lecture of physicist Richard Feynman, where he
explains how a computer can be viewed as an extremely fast but extremely stupid file clerk.
22Cantor first proved the result under the stronger A  Z  B assumption (Cantor, 1895). Nearly
six decades later—at the suggestion of Savage, according to the acknowledgment—Debreu attempted to
prove the result under the weaker A % Z % B assumption (Debreu, 1954). Debreu then noticed an error
in his own proof, which he corrected a decade later using his acclaimed Gap Lemma (Debreu, 1964). For
narrative clarity, we have chosen a weaker statement than that in Debreu (1964). In fact A need not
be a σ-algebra, and without assumption (ii), Debreu proves there is a representation u which is upper
semi-continuous in any topology for which upper contour sets are closed and lower semi-continuous in
any topology for which lower contour sets are closed.
13
label the drawer filed with events to which we should like to eventually assign probability
v. Since we can only choose a countably infinite collection of anticipated probabilities
from [0, 1] as labels, I propose we take the dyadic rationals, 2 ⊆ [0, 1]:
2 ≡ {
∑
i∈F
(
1
2
)i|F ⊆ N, |F | < |N|} ∪ {1}.
The dyadic rationals can be thought of as the labels appearing anywhere in a sequence of
progressively-finer rulers, the first ruler measuring halves of a foot, the second ruler mea-
suring fourths, the third ruler measuring eights, and in general the kth ruler measuring
( 1
2k
)ths.
Of course, it is not enough to simply repaint the cabinet; these new labels must be
operationalized:
Definition: For each qualitative probability space (S,A,%), a collection of equivalence
classes {Zv}v∈2 ⊆ [A/∼] is a supercabinet of (S,A,%) if
[SC1] ∅ ∈ Z0 and S ∈ Z1,
[SC2] for each pair v, v′ ∈ 2 such that v + v′ ≤ 1, there are disjoint Zv ∈ Zv and
Zv′ ∈ Zv′ such that Zv ∪ Zv′ ∈ Zv+v′ ,
[SC3] for each non-increasing (v+i ) ∈ 2N and non-decreasing (v−i ) ∈ 2N such that
lim v+i = lim v
−
i ,
23 there are are convergent (A+i ), (A
−
i ) ∈ AN such that
(i) for each i ∈ N, A+i ∈ Zv+i and A
−
i ∈ Zv−i , and
(ii) limA+i = limA
−
i .
[SC4] for each monotonic pair (vi), (wi) ∈ 2N such that for each i ∈ N, vi + wi ≤ 1,
there are convergent (Ai), (Bi) ∈ AN such that for each i ∈ N, Ai and Bi are disjoint with
Ai ∈ Zvi and Bi ∈ Zwi .
Though it is not obvious by comparing the definitions, a supercabinet is a special
kind of cabinet; this follows from our next lemma. The key idea behind the additional
structure is given by [SC2]: if I give a file clerk two anticipated probabilities v and v′,
and their sum does not exceed 1, then he should be able to take an event Zv from the
drawer labeled v and an event Zv′ from the drawer labeled v
′. Moreover, he should be
able to choose this pair so that Zv and Zv′ are disjoint. Finally, he should be able to find
their union Zv∪Zv′ filed in the drawer labeled v+v′. The following lemma promises that
if we can construct a supercabinet, then we are done:
Supercabinet Blueprint Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space that
has a supercabinet and satisfies monotone continuity, then there is a unique µ ∈ Mσ(A)
such that µ represents %.
As expected, for each v ∈ 2, the unique measure representation assigns to each event
in Zv the probability v; indeed by design, any measure representation must. A continuity
argument takes care of the un-filed events; see Appendix 2 for the proof.
With the blueprint in hand, let us begin construction.
23Since both sequences are bounded, they are also convergent.
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3.2 Constructing halves
It is easy enough to file the empty set (and those events equally likely) into Z0, and to
file the state space (and those events equally likely) into Z1. The next drawer we shall
populate is Z 1
2
. This might well be expected: such “even-chance” events play a role in the
approach outlined by Ramsey (1931), and their existence is sometimes directly assumed
(see for example Gul, 1992). Here, however, we need not make any such assumption; we
shall instead construct such an event.
We can already compare two events according to relative likelihood with %; let us
forget that for a moment. Let us instead consider comparing two events lexicographically:
A >LEX B if and only if minA\B < minB\A.
In other words, when comparing distinct A and B, let s be the smallest-index state for
which s is in one event but not the other. If s ∈ A, then A >LEX B, else B >LEX A.
It is well-known that there is an order-preserving homeomorphism—let us call it Ψ—
between
(i) the subsets of the natural numbers ordered lexicographically, and
(ii) the canonical Cantor set (Cantor, 1883) with the standard ordering of reals.24
This observation is important because of the intimate relationship between order and
topology on the real line—after all, the standard topology is generated by upper and
lower contour sets! Indeed, on the real line each compact set has a maximum, and because
the Cantor set is bounded, by the Heine-Borel Theorem each of its closed subsets has
a maximum. Because of Ψ, in our environment every closed collection of events has a
lexicographic maximum.
In particular, the collection of events that are no more likely than their complements,
A− ≡ {B ∈ A|(S\B) % B},
is closed, and therefore has a lexicographic maximum H.
Can H have a finite complement? Under 1-AS, no: if there were some s = max(S\H),
then the event (H\{s + 1, s + 2, ..., }) ∪ {s} would be lexicographically greater than H,
but by 1-AS would also belong to A−, contradicting the definition of H. Thus H has an
infinite complement, and by construction the union of H with any state in (S\H) is
(i) lexicographically greater than H, and thus
(ii) outside of A−, and thus
(iii) more likely than its complement.
It follows from a continuity argument that H is just as likely as its complement, and
can therefore be properly be filed into drawer Z 1
2
. In order to use the full power of this
observation, we wish to state it when the event we are trying to split in halves is not
necessarily all of S, but rather might be any collection A with the required structure. We
do this using the notion of subspaces:
24In fact, Ψ has a simple explanation. Consider the standard construction of the Cantor set through
iterative removal of middle thirds. A point in the Cantor set is identified through a sequence of ‘lefts’
and ‘rights’: at each stage of the construction, we record some smallest interval, and after middle thirds
are removed, we record either its left or right subinterval; the point is the unique intersection of this
sequence of recorded intervals. For each A ⊆ N, Ψ(A) chooses ‘right’ at the kth step if k ∈ A; otherwise
it chooses ‘left’—in this way a sequence of inclusions and exclusions encodes a sequence of rights and
lefts to uniquely determine a point in the Cantor set. By inspection, Ψ is an order-preserving bijection,
and it is routine to show that Ψ and its inverse are continuous.
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Definition:25 For each likelihood space (S,A,%) and each A ∈ A, define the A-subspace
of (S,A,%), (S,A,%)|A, to be the likelihood space (A,A ∩ 2A,%|A), where %|A is the
binary relation on A ∩ 2A defined by:
B %|A C if and only if B,C ∈ A ∩ 2A and B % C.
We sometimes abuse notation, writing %|A to denote the entire likelihood space
(S,A,%)|A. Using this notion, we can talk about ‘halving’ events with the required
structure:
First Halving Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying monotone continuity, then for each A ∈ A such that A  ∅ and %|A
satisfies 1-AS, there is H ⊆ A such that H ∼ A\H and A  H  ∅.
The proof, sketched throughout this section, is in Appendix 4. Thus it is through the
Cantor set that we first glimpse cardinality in our ordinal relation.
3.3 Greedy transforms
In practice, what must come next is the population of Z 1
4
, then Z 1
8
, and so on. For
the moment, however, let us set this problem aside and consider another: if we have
populated drawers Zv and Zv′ , with v + v′ ≤ 1, how can we take one event from Zv and
another event from Zv′ so that these two events do not intersect?
Remarkably, it turns out that regardless of v′, we can always succeed if we first ‘blindly’
take a specific event from Zv. Moreover, this event is specifically the lexicographic-
maximum of Zv. Moreover, this event can be constructed with a so-called “greedy”
algorithm. This section is dedicated to that algorithm, which turns out to have further
use in the construction of the supercabinet.
In order to build intuition, it is helpful to once again anticipate probabilities—
especially, here, as numbers associated with singleton events. For the sake of analogy, let
us think of singleton events as coins and the associated numbers as monetary values. Let
us also think of v as a bus fare, and consider the following scenario:
Scenario 1: You would like to take a bus, and in order to do so, you must pay the fare
with exact change. The fare is described to you with a sign specifying the number v.
In your wallet, you have various coins in different denominations. Can you make exact
change, and if so, how?
One possible approach is to use the following greedy algorithm: consider your coins,
one at a time, in non-increasing order of value. If the coin under consideration puts your
running total over the fare, then return it to your wallet; otherwise, place it into your
palm. Once you have considered every coin, present the pile in your palm to the bus
driver.
25We emphasize that because %|A compares only subevents of A, this notion is distinct from conditional
qualitative probability (Savage, 1954). We do not use conditional probabilities anywhere in this article,
and we postulate nothing about how beliefs change in response to new information.
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It is easy to see the greedy algorithm can unnecessarily fail, for example if the fare
is 30¢ when you have a quarter and three dimes.26 But there is a particular class of
problems for which the greedy algorithm always works: when you have a countably
infinite collection of coins whose value tends to zero, your total wealth exceeds the fare,
and the value of each coin is less than the value of all smaller coins.27 Essentially, the
algorithm works because there is always enough and never too much: if a coin is skipped,
there is always enough to make up for it, and by design, there is never too much in your
palm.
For our purposes, this is only the intuition: while the above logic will apply when
at last we have probabilities, we do not have them yet. Right now, we only have some
populated drawer Zv; there may not be any singletons at all that have yet been filed!
Nevertheless, it is possible to modify the analogy to suit our situation by considering
another world where coins do not feature numbers, but rather the value of a pile of coins
is given by its mass:
Scenario 2: You would like to take a bus, and in order to do so, you must pay the
posted fare with exact change. The fare is described to you with a pile of coins B on one
arm of a balance. In your wallet, you have various coins. Can you make exact change,
and if so, how?
As it turns out, under the analogous ordinal condition for the coins in your wallet, an
analogue of the greedy algorithm works. If A represents the coins in your wallet, and B
represents the fare, then let GA(B) represent the outcome of the greedy algorithm:
Definition: If (S,A,%) is purely-σ-catalogued, then for each A ∈ A, we define the
greedy transform GA : A → A as follows. For each B ∈ A, define GA(B) ⊆ A by:
• Define GA0 (B) ≡ ∅.
• For each i ∈ N, define
GAi (B) ≡
{ GAi−1(B) ∪ {i}, i ∈ A and B % GAi−1(B) ∪ {i}
GAi−1(B), else.
• Clearly (GAi (B)) ∈ AN is convergent. Define
GA(B) ≡ limGAi (B).
By construction and by monotone continuity, B % GA(B). Provided A % B, when is
equivalence guaranteed? As promised:
1-AS Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satis-
fying monotone continuity, then for each A ∈ A such that %|A satisfies 1-AS and each
B ∈ A such that A % B, GA(B) ∼ B.
26This failure is an implication of a broader principle: determining whether or not you can make exact
change is NP -complete, even if it is given that all coin values and the fare are integers! This is the subset
sum problem, a special case of the knapsack problem; see for example Garey and Johnson (1979).
27This observation is due to Kakeya (Kakeya, 1914; Kakeya, 1915), who moreover showed that for any
sequence (µi) ∈ RN with finite sum, the collection of subsequence sums is convex if and only if for each
i ∈ N, ∑j>i µ(j) ≥ µ(i).
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In other words, if A represents your collection of coins, its subspace satisfies 1-AS,
and you have at least enough for the fare, then GA(B) precisely pays for the fare. The
intuition for why this works is the same as before—after all, “always enough” and “never
too much” are ordinal statements!
Thus the file clerk can open the populated drawer Zv, remove any event B, and
set it as the fare. Then, using the greedy algorithm, he can produce GS(B), which by
construction is necessarily the lexicographic-maximum of Zv.
3.4 Iterative halving and disjoint pairs
In the last section, we established that under 1-AS,
(i) the lexicographic-maximum of a drawer, and
(ii) the greedy transform, with S as the wallet, of any event from that drawer,
are equivalent. But why bother? If we simply intend to take the lexicographic-maximum,
why spend time on this detour about how it can be constructed?
The reason is that the greedy transforms have further use; in fact, Appendix 3 is
dedicated to its properties. To sketch our proof, we will discuss only the most fundamental
of these properties:28
Greedy Removal Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying monotone continuity, then for each k ∈ N, each A ∈ A such that %|A
satisfies (k + 1)-AS, and each B ∈ A,
%|A\GA(B) satisfies k-AS.
That is, if (the subspace associated with) A satisfies (k + 1)-AS, then removing an
image of its greedy transform yields a subevent that (has a subspace which) satisfies
k-AS. As a first corollary, we have:
Second Halving Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying monotone continuity and 2-AS, then for each A ∈ A such that A  ∅,
there are disjoint H(A), H ′(A) ∈ A such that
(1) A ∼ H(A) ∪H ′(A), and
(2) A  H(A) ∼ H ′(A)  ∅.
The idea is simple: remove GS(S\A), then apply the First Halving Lemma. In this
way, we can make ‘halves’ of any event, and therefore populate Z 1
4
, Z 1
8
, and so on. The
proof is in Appendix 4.
As a second corollary to the Greedy Removal Lemma, we can construct disjoint pairs.
This can be understood in terms of a third bus scenario:
Scenario 3: You would like to take two consecutive buses: the first to the city center,
and the second from there to your destination. In order to do so, for each bus, you must
pay the posted fare. The first fare is described to you with a pile of coins B1 on one arm
of a balance on the first bus; the second fare is described with a pile of coins B2 on one
28In private communication, Vilmos Komornik proved the cardinal analogue of the Greedy Re-
moval Lemma (Komornik, 2015). Theorem KK, which we use in our proof of Theorem 2, is a joint
implication of the results of Kakeya and Komornik.
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arm of a balance on the second bus. In your wallet, you have various coins. Can you
make exact change, and if so, how?
Suppose you begin with S in your wallet. As before, you can use the greedy transform
to make exact change with the pile GS(B1). At that point, what remains in your wallet
is S\GS(B1). By the Greedy Removal Lemma, the required wallet structure for the
greedy algorithm to work has been preserved! Thus you can make exact change for the
second bus with the pile GS\GS(B1)(B2). These two payments are disjoint: physically,
GS(B1) remains on the first bus, while GS\GS(B1)(B2) remains on the second; there is no
intersection between the two.
Thus given populated Zv and Zv′ , the file clerk can first take some arbitrary A ∈ Zv
and B ∈ Zv′ . These may intersect; nevertheless, the file clerk can then take Zv to be
GS(A) and take Zv′ to be GS\Zv(B), and these do not intersect.
3.5 Supercabinet construction
We are now ready to construct the supercabinet. Let us begin with too many drawers:
there is not only one labeled 1
2
, but also one labeled 2
4
, another labeled 16
32
, and so on.
In general, for each pair p, q ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} with p ≤ 2q, there is a drawer labeled p
2q
.
We let Zpq denote the drawer labeled p2q , and once Zpq is populated, we let Apq denote its
lexicographic-maximum.
First, we fill the drawers of the form 1
2q
through iterative applications of the Sec-
ond Halving Lemma. Then, for each q, we fill the drawers of the form p
2q
through iterative
disjoint union involving A1q. To be more explicit about this latter operation: given A
p
q ,
we define
Ap+1q ≡ GS
(
Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q)
)
.
This process can be understood as the construction of a sequence of progressively finer
rulers (Figure 3).
At this point, with 2-AS, it is possible to show that the extra drawers are in fact
redundant: if two drawers bear labels that share a reduced fraction, then their contents
are the same. So should we discard all the redundant drawers—say, keeping only those
whose labels are reduced fractions—to yield our supercabinet? Not yet; the problem is
that while this would yield properly-painted drawers that are populated, we do not yet
know that this structure would indeed be supercabinet. In particular, we know that if
we give the file clerk v and v′ with v+ v′ ≤ 1, he can locate Zv in Zv and Zv′ in Zv′ such
that Zv and Zv′ are disjoint, but we do not know that he can locate Zv ∪ Zv′ in Zv+v′ .
Toward this end, it turns out that it is convenient to continue with the redundant
drawers in order to emphasize the different constructions that lead to the same equivalence
class. In particular, for each q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and each pair p, p′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q} such that
p+ p′ ≤ 2q, define:
Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q ≡ GS
(
Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′
q )
)
.
In order to prove that this binary operation in fact captures addition—that Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q =
Ap+p
′
q —we follow Peano’s axiomatization of addition (Peano, 1889). The essential step
of the inductive argument is establishing that Ap+p
′
q = A
p
q
⊎
Ap
′
q implies A
p+(p′+1)
q =
19
Figure 3: Each row is one member in our sequence of progressively finer rulers. The
leftmost point on each is identified by ∅. The diagonal dotted lines represent construction
through “halving.” The horizontal dashed lines represent construction through “addition
by one.” It can be proved that any two events aligned vertically are in fact the same
event.
Apq
⊎
Ap
′+1
q . It is here that we require 3-AS: in general, |{p, p′, 1}| = 3. It is in this way
that we can deduce cancellation instead of assuming it, and prove:
Supercabinet Construction Lemma: If (S,A,%) is purely-σ-catalogued and satis-
fies 3-AS, then (S,A,%) has a supercabinet.
For details, and to see that the other supercabinet properties can be verified, see
Appendix 5. Together with the Supercabinet Blueprint Lemma, we have at once:
Theorem 1: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
monotone continuity and 3-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
The formal proof is in Appendix 5.
4 Proof sketch for Theorem 2
Next, we turn our attention to finitely-catalogued qualitative probability spaces. As with
Theorem 1, we proceed by constructing a supercabinet.
Recall that S⊕ gathers the states whose singletons are the cores; S◦ gathers the other
states; and A◦ is the collection of events contained in S◦, which includes no atoms. Our
approach is to apply the Supercabinet Construction Lemma to a purely-σ-catalogued
space which is derived from our finitely-catalogued space, essentially by partitioning S◦
into events that we temporarily pretend are cores.
To begin, finitely-catalogued spaces involve events that contain no atoms, which it is
helpful to think of as cloth-like fabric that may be cut into smaller pieces of any specifi-
cation. Indeed, by Theorem V2, %|S◦ has an infinitely-divisible measure representation
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µ◦, and moreover, this intuition is even harmonious with atoms:
Carving Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
monotone continuity, then for each pair A,B ∈ A such that A ∈ A◦ and A % B, there is
B′ ⊆ A such that B′ ∈ A and B′ ∼ B.
The proof, which unsurprisingly involves retracing some arguments from Villegas
(1964), is in Appendix 6.
How do we partition S◦? Before we begin, let us call S◦ the fabric. At each step, we
cut off a piece of the fabric and reclassify it as an honorary core, and after an infinite
sequence of steps we finish and are out of fabric. Because it is convenient to work with
µ◦, we first use the Carving Lemma and Theorem V2 to cut off an arbitrary non-null
event that is less likely than the least-likely core. By 3-AS, this first honorary core is less
likely than S◦ as well, and we are therefore left with some (non-null) fabric. We then
proceed recursively.
At the start of each step, some (non-null) fabric remains. Let A be the least-likely of
the actual and honorary cores, which in fact will always be honorary. We use Theorem V2
to partition what remains of the fabric into four equally likely events: B1, B2, B3, and
B4. If A % B1, then we cut off B1; otherwise, we use the Carving Lemma to cut off an
event that is as likely as Ai. In both cases, fabric indeed remains after the cut.
Appealing to µ◦, it is clear that we first cut off some finite number of pieces that have
the same measure as the first honorary core, after which point each new honorary core is
less likely than its predecessors. By construction, each of these latter honorary cores has
a measure equal to three times the sum of the measures of its successors. Put another
way, beyond a certain point, the measures of the honorary cores are geometric: if one has
measure v, then the next has measure 3v
4
.
We now have a coarser σ-algebra A′ ⊆ A: the cores, the honorary cores, and their
unions. By taking the restriction of % to A′ and relabeling the singletons, we con-
struct a finitely-catalogued qualitative probability space that (we verify) satisfies 3-AS.
At this point, we apply the Supercabinet Construction Lemma to produce a supercab-
inet, and in doing so reveal a supercabinet for the original space. By the Supercabi-
net Blueprint Lemma, we have established:
Theorem 2: If (S,A,%) is a finitely-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
monotone continuity and 3-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
The formal proof is in Appendix 6.
5 Proof sketch for Theorem 4
5.1 Splitting the atoms
At last, we are ready to consider σ-catalogued qualitative probability spaces, where there
is some messy sequence of cores S⊕ together with some infinitely-divisible fabric S◦.
Essentially, there are two major steps: (i) construct µ, and (ii) verify that it is a rep-
resentation. In a way, these steps are intertwined: we do not construct µ as directly as
possible, but rather take an indirect path that reveals much of what µ represents. This
section is dedicated to describing this indirect path at a high level.
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The fundamental technique in this construction is splitting the atoms into a left space
and a right space. In particular, imagine that the cores are arranged along a line from left
to right in non-increasing order of likelihood. In order to split the atoms, simply pick an
adjacent pair of cores and build a wall between them. So long as this wall is in place, the
left atoms are segregated from the right: we will consider the left cores with the fabric,
and separately we will consider the right cores with the fabric, but never will we consider
the left and right cores together. Once we are done, we may tear down that wall and
build another elsewhere, but at any given time there will always be at most one wall.
Formally, for each ‘middle’ m ∈ S⊕, we define two qualitative probability spaces, one
for the left and the other for the right:
• Define S←m ≡ {1, 2, ...,m} ∪ S◦; define A←m to be the events contained in S←m;
and let %←m be the associated restriction of %.
• Define Sm→ ≡ {m,m+ 1, ...} ∪S◦; define Am→ to be the events contained in Sm→;
and let %m→ be the associated restriction of %.
In the informal description, building a wall means separately considering S←m and Sm+1→
(and their associated spaces).
Our first order of business is to establish that far enough in the tail—that is, for
sufficiently high m—the left and right spaces each have a unique measure representation.
For such a pair S←m and Sm+1→, we can then stitch the two measures together, thus
constructing a grand measure µm over the entire space A that represents both the left
and right spaces. Finally, we establish that all of these grand measures coincide, and we
take this common measure as µ, completing the construction. (Note that there is then
still more to be done, as it is not enough for a measure to represent all comparisons where
both events come from the same left or right space deep in the tail.)
5.2 Deep left spaces
We first show that each sufficiently deep left space has a unique measure representation.
One might view all of our work thus far as culminating in this fact: the left spaces are
finitely-catalogued, and we will therefore apply Theorem 2, whose proof required the
construction of a supercabinet. However, we can not apply Theorem 2 just yet: while
left spaces are finitely-catalogued, they need not satisfy 3-AS.
In fact, while it is true (and we will establish) that sufficiently deep left spaces do
satisfy 3-AS when the grand space satisfies 3+-AS, this is not necessarily so when the
grand space only satisfies 3-AS. Indeed, suppose the most-likely core {1} is such that
S\{1} can be partitioned into three events that are each precisely as likely as {1}. In
this case, each left space includes {1}, yet discards some (non-null) cores and thus cannot
satisfy 3-AS.
As promised, this is no problem when the grand space satisfies 3+-AS. For each s ∈ S⊕,
let us say that t ≥ s is a truncation point of s if, informally, even after truncating the
tail beyond t, {s} is third-order swarmed by less-likely non-null events. By a continuity
argument, we can construct for each s a particular truncation point τ(s). Moreover, by
another continuity argument, deep enough in the tail each s is its own truncation point,
as eventually the cores become smaller than ‘thirds’ of the fabric. Letting s∗ ∈ S⊕ denote
the earliest s which is its own truncation point, we define
m←∗ ≡ max{τ(1), τ(2), ..., τ(s∗ − 1), τ(s∗)}.
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By construction, if m ≥ m←∗, then (S←m,A←m,%←m) satisfies 3-AS, and thus by Theo-
rem 2 has a unique representation µ←m. Altogether, each sufficiently deep left space has
a unique measure representation.
5.3 Deep right spaces
While each left space has a finite number of cores and some fabric, and some of them
satisfy the requirements of Theorem 2, this is not the case for the right spaces. Each
right space is a messy sequence of cores together with some fabric, and in this way is like
the grand space.
That said, in deeper right spaces the relative likelihood of the cores is smaller, and in
sufficiently deep right spaces the cores are less likely than the fabric. It turns out that
this is sufficient for our purposes:
Theorem 3: If (S,A,%) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying mono-
tone continuity and unlikely cores, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
While this result is of independent interest, for the purposes of this section Theorem 3
is simply a lemma for Theorem 4. It turns out that the smaller proof-within-a-proof
has the same structure as the larger proof—construct the measure, then verify it is a
representation—and moreover, the smaller proof’s verification step is a simpler version
of the larger proof’s.
The construction of the measure is simple: use Theorem V2 to construct a repre-
sentation of the fabric; use the Carving Lemma to associate each union of cores with
an equally likely fabric event; assign to each union of cores the measure of its associate;
complete the measure and normalize.
For verification, the idea is that for each pair of events A and B, we use a particular
algorithm to construct a list of pairs (A,B) = (A1, B1), (A2, B2), (A3, B3), ... such that
for each i, we can establish:
(i) Ai % Bi if and only if Ai+1 % Bi+1, and
(ii) µ(Ai) ≥ µ(Bi) if and only if µ(Ai+1) ≥ µ(Bi+1).
Moreover, the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate with a pair (AΩ, BΩ) for which we
can prove the statement “AΩ % BΩ if and only if µ(AΩ) ≥ µ(BΩ).” Visually, it can be
helpful to imagine a “logical ladder” whose rails and rungs are made of if-and-only-if
arrows.
How does this algorithm work? At each step i, let n◦i ∈ {0, 1, 2} count how many
of Ai and Bi intersect S
◦, and similarly let n⊕i ∈ {0, 1, 2} count how many of Ai and
Bi intersect S
⊕. We proceed by performing the operation for the earliest of these cases
which applies:
1. If Ai = ∅ or Bi = ∅, then it is easy to show that we are done.
2. If either count is zero, then we are either comparing two fabric events or two unions
of cores, and it is easy to show that we are done.
3. If n◦i = 2, then we can use the Carving Lemma to replace the smaller fabric com-
ponent with one that is contained within the larger, then subtract this from both.
We begin the next step with n◦i+1 < 2 and n
⊕
i+1 = n
⊕
i .
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4. If n◦i = 1 and n
⊕
i = 2, then one of the events is a union of cores. Because the fabric
is more likely than the cores, by the Carving Lemma, we can replace the union of
cores with an equally-likely fabric event. We begin the next step with n◦i = 2 and
n⊕i+1 = 1.
5. If n◦i = 1 and n
⊕
i = 1, and neither Ai nor Bi is ∅, then as in the previous case,
we can replace the union of cores with an equally-likely fabric event. We begin the
next step with n◦i = 2 and n
⊕
i+1 = 0.
It is clear that this process must terminate. For details, see Appendix 7.
With Theorem 3 established, we return to the deep right spaces in our proof of
Theorem 4. Indeed, we simply define
m∗→ ≡ min{s ∈ S⊕|S◦ % {s, s+ 1, ...}},
which is well-defined by a continuity argument. By construction, if m ≥ m∗→, then
(Sm→,Am→,%m→) satisfies unlikely cores, and thus by Theorem 3 has a unique rep-
resentation µm→. Altogether, each sufficiently deep right space has a unique measure
representation.
5.4 Constructing the measure
In this section, we construct µ not once or twice, but an infinite number of times. In
particular, for each sufficiently deep m, we use the results of the previous sections to
construct a unique measure µm that represents both the associated left space and the
associated right space. We then show that all of these measures are in fact the same
measure, which we call µ.
To begin, define m∗ ≡ max{m←∗,m∗→}, take m ≥ m∗, and split the atoms by building
a wall between m and m + 1. By the previous sections, we have unique representations
µ←m and µm+1→ for the left space and the right space, respectively. To build a grand
measure µm such that
(i) the restriction to the left space is a positive multiple of µ←m, and
(ii) the restriction to the right space is a positive multiple of µm+1→,
it suffices to simply solve a system of equations to determine µm(S◦), µm({1, 2, ...,m}),
and µm({m + 1,m + 2, ...}, then complete the measure. Altogether, µm exists as the
unique measure on A that represents both comparisons for pairs in A←m and for pairs
in Am+1→.
We claim that for each pair m,m′ ≥ m∗, µm = µm′ . It suffices to prove that for
each m ≥ m∗, µm = µm+1, and due to the uniqueness of each measure, it suffices to
prove that µm+1 represents both comparisons for pairs in A←m and for pairs in Am+1→.
Representation for the former comparisons is immediate as A←m ⊆ A←m+1, so we need
only establish representation for comparisons of pairs in Am+1→. The argument involves
establishing that normalizations of µm and µm+1 restricted to Am+1→ are both measure
representations when further restricted toAm+2→, and thus agree everywhere but {m+1};
and then also there as well, since by the Carving Lemma {m+ 1} has the same measure
as some equally-likely fabric event. For details, see Step 6 in Appendix 8.
Altogether, we have a measure µ on A that represents all sufficiently deep left spaces
and all sufficiently deep right spaces. At this point, all that remains is to verify that µ
in fact represents all comparisons.
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5.5 Verification of representation
Again, we proceed as we did in the proof of Theorem 3 to verify representation. In
particular: again, we take an arbitrary pair of events A and B and construct a “logical
ladder” of if-and-only-if arrows. Again, by algorithm, we construct a list of pairs (A,B) =
(A1, B1), (A2, B2), (A3, B3), ... such that for each i, we can establish:
(i) Ai % Bi if and only if Ai+1 % Bi+1, and
(ii) µ(Ai) ≥ µ(Bi) if and only if µ(Ai+1) ≥ µ(Bi+1).
Again, the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate with a pair (AΩ, BΩ) for which we can
prove the statement “AΩ % BΩ if and only if µ(AΩ) ≥ µ(BΩ).” But this time, the
algorithm involves a partition of the state space into three parts instead of two.
Before we begin, we require one final technique. For a given core {s}, we would like
to construct a finite twin: an equally-likely event which, if it includes any cores, only
includes a finite number of less-likely ones. If the fabric alone is at least as likely as {s},
then we can do so by the Carving Lemma. In fact, even if the fabric and less-likely cores
are together more likely than {s}, we can succeed—provided the fabric is at least as likely
as the less-likely cores:
Finite-Twin Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfy-
ing monotone continuity and 1+-AS, then for each s ∈ S⊕ such that S◦ % {s+1, s+2, ...},
there is Ts ∈ A such that
(i) Ts ⊆ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...} ∪ S◦,
(ii) Ts ∩ S⊕ is finite, and
(iii) Ts ∼ {s}.
How does the algorithm work? To begin, we partition S into S◦, S← ≡ {1, 2, ...,m∗},
and S→ ≡ {m∗+ 1,m∗+ 2, ...}. Let us say that each event A ∈ A has three components:
its left component A∩ S←, its right component A∩ S→, and its fabric component A∩ S◦.
At each step i, we count components. More precisely, let n◦i ∈ {0, 1, 2} count how
many of Ai and Bi intersect S
◦, let n← ∈ {0, 1, 2} count how many of Ai and Bi intersect
S←, and let n→i ∈ {0, 1, 2} count how many of Ai and Bi intersect S→. We proceed by
performing the operation for the earliest of these cases which applies:
1. If Ai = ∅ or Bi = ∅, then it is easy to show that we are done.
2. If any count is zero, we are done. This is immediate if both Ai and Bi belong
to the same left space or the same right space, while if both are contained in S⊕
this can be established by using the Carving Lemma to exchange each event’s right
component with an equally-likely fabric component, leaving us with two events in
the same left space.
3. If n◦i = 2, then we can use the Carving Lemma to replace the smaller fabric com-
ponent with one that is contained within the larger, then subtract this from both.
We begin the next step with n◦i+1 < 2 and n
→
i+1 = n
→
i .
4. If n◦i = 1 and n
→
i = 2, then one of the events has no fabric component. Because
the fabric is more likely than the cores, by the Carving Lemma, we can replace
this event’s right component with an equally-likely fabric component. We begin
the next step with n◦i = 2 and n
→
i+1 = 1.
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5. If n◦i = 1 and n
→ = 1, and neither event is only a left component, then as in the
previous case, there is an event with no fabric component, and we can replace its
right component with an equally-likely fabric component. We begin the next step
with n◦i = 2 and n
→
i+1 = 0.
6. If n◦i = 1 and n
→ = 1, and one of the events is only a left component but neither
event is ∅, then at this point we modify the left-only event. In particular, we use
the Finite-Twin Lemma to replace the highest-index core with its finite twin. How
do we know that µ assigns both twins the same measure? We know this because
while the finite twin may extend far past m∗ into S→, nevertheless, there is some
deeper left space which both twins share.
It is straightforward to verify that we cannot indefinitely loop through the first four
instructions, while immediately after the fifth the algorithm will terminate. Thus in
order for the algorithm to loop forever, the sixth operation must be performed an infinite
number of times. But this is impossible: each time the sixth operation is performed,
one of the two left components becomes lexicographically-smaller; and none of the other
operations alter left components; thus because A← is finite, the process must terminate.
This completes our verification that µ is in fact a measure; for details, see Appendix 8.
Altogether, we have established:
Theorem 4: If (S,A,%) is a σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying mono-
tone continuity and 3+-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
6 Proof sketch for Theorem 5
Our final objective is to establish that, as promised, there has been essentially no loss
of generality in focusing on catalogued spaces where each atom has a singleton core.
This last step is relatively simple: we select some pairwise-disjoint collection of atoms
and remove them, and do so such that there are no atoms in what remains. In general,
there is not a unique such collection, but the selection does not matter for our purposes.
Using an argument of Villegas (1964) (though not his related result, which has a minor
mistake29), this collection is at most countably infinite. When we ‘pretend’ that they are
cores, we can apply Theorem 1, Theorem 2, or Theorem 4; for details, see Appendix 9.
This completes the proof of our main result:
Theorem 5: A triple (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space satisfying monotone
continuity and 3+-AS if and only if it has a unique representation µ ∈ Mσ(A) such that
for each A ∈ A,
(i) if A is an atom, µ(∪(↓ A)) > 3µ(A) > 0, and
(ii) if A contains no atoms, for each λ ∈ [0, 1], there is B ⊆ A such that µ(B) = λµ(A).
29Lemma 4 of Villegas (1964) incorrectly claims that for each monotonely continuous qualitative prob-
ability, the collection of atoms is at most countably infinite. As a counterexample, consider S = [0, 1] and
the (monotonely continuous) qualitative probability on 2S for which {0} ∼ S: each event that includes
0 is an atom. To address this, we simply borrow the sound arguments and replace the faulty ones.
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7 Conclusion
Our main results do not require one to interpret A as a collection of events and % as
beliefs; we discuss two alternative interpretations here.
Preferences over parts of a heterogeneous good
What sort of economic model allows us to classify an infinitely-divisible good as either
homogeneous or heterogeneous? One approach is to consider a collection of pieces into
which the good may be divided, and associate each agent with a personal measure over
these pieces his preferences respect. When all agents share a measure—such as gallons
when the good is milk—the good is homogeneous. When the agents’ measures differ, the
good is instead heterogeneous.
The classic problem of fair division, starting with Steinhaus (1948), is the problem
of partitioning a heterogeneous good (or a cake) into parts (or slices) and then assigning
those parts to agents according to some notion of fairness. Similarly, the model of land
for urban economics proposed by Berliant (1985) treats land as a heterogeneous good that
can be divided into parcels; this model has also been used in the context of fair division
(Berliant, Thomson, and Dunz, 1992). The standard assumption in both settings is that
each agent’s preferences are represented by a measure, and the use of atomless measures
has axiomatic foundations for both preferences over slices (Barbanel and Taylor, 1995) and
preferences over parcels (Berliant, 1986). Our theorem is also a preference representation
theorem for these settings, differing from the existing results in that it allows atoms:
crumbs in the context of cake-cutting,30 or parcels that cannot be subdivided (such as
perhaps cities or houses) in the context of land.
Intertemporal preferences
The standard model of intertemporal preference is a special case of the Savage model
with an alternative interpretation of its primitives: S = N, with its usual well-ordering,
the members of S interpreted as periods. This literature studies preferences of an agent (or
dynasty, or institution) over consumption streams, and the preferences with σ-measure
subjective expected utility representations are precisely, in the language of Olea and
Strzalecki (2014), the time separable class. This central class contains:
• geometric discounting, (Samuelson, 1937; Koopmans, 1960; Koopmans, 1972; Ble-
ichrodt, Rohde, and Wakker, 2008),
• generalized hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), and
• quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997; Olea and Strzalecki, 2014).
Because this class uses atoms, the Savage (1954) characterization of subjective expected
utility does not apply. The standard approach in the literature is to take preferences
over consumption streams with a rich consumption space, such as Euclidean commodity
space.
By contrast, our theorem applies in the minimal case that commodity space has two
members, allowing us to handle the case where consumption in each period consists of
some indivisible goods (or objects). This setting is also considered by Kochov (2013), who
30An example of such a crumb is the small plastic figurine (la fe`ve) in a French king cake. According
to tradition, whomever receives it with his slice is king for the day.
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proposes patience: consumption of the better object on dates {2, 3, ...} is preferred to con-
sumption of the better object on date {1}. Kochov establishes that if % has a geometric
representation and satisfies patience, then % has no other geometric representation; a
corollary is that a geometric representation is unique under 1-AS.
Our atom-swarming axioms may be interpreted as stronger patience requirements—
after all, each atom is a date, and for each date the less-likely non-null events (usually) are
gathered by the dates that follow; thus these axioms (usually) require that at any point
in time the future sufficiently overwhelms the present. In the special case that beliefs
admit a geometric representation, 3+-AS is satisfied if and only the discount factor is
greater than
3
4
.
Appendix 1
In this appendix, we state and prove (or provide a proof reference for) four basic lemmas
about qualitative probabilities: the Complement Lemma, the Domination Lemma, the
Continuity Lemma, and the Limit-Order Lemma.
The Complement Lemma states that order reverses under complements. This is a
slight extension of exercise 3 on page 32 of Savage (1972), and thus the proof is omitted.
• Complement Lemma (Savage, 1954): If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space,
then for each A ∈ A and each pair B,B′ ⊆ A, B % B′ if and only if A\B′ % A\B.
The Domination Lemma states that for any two pairs such that the first is disjoint
and dominates the second in likelihood, the union of the first is at least as likely as the
union of the second. Moreover, strict domination implies the union of the first is more
likely than the union of the second. This is a slight extension of exercise 5a on page 32
of Savage (1972), and thus the proof is omitted.
• Domination Lemma (Savage, 1954): If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space,
then for each four A,A′, B,B′ ∈ A, if
(1) A ∩ A′ = ∅,
(2) A % B, and
(3) A′ % B′,
then A ∪ A′ % B ∪B′. Moreover, if A  B, then A ∪ A′  B ∪B′.
The Continuity Lemma involves pointwise convergence, its associated topology (under
which A is closed), and the standard requirement that upper and lower contour sets are
closed:
Definition: An event sequence (Ai) ∈ AN is convergent if for each s ∈ S, either
(1) there is i∗ ∈ N such that for each i ≥ i∗, s ∈ Ai, and
(2) there is i∗ ∈ N such that for each i ≥ i∗, s 6∈ Ai.
In this case, we say ∪∞i=1(∩∞j=iAj) = ∩∞i=1(∪∞j=iAj) is the (pointwise) limit of (Ai), written
limAi.
◦ Continuity: For each A ∈ A and each convergent (Bi) ∈ AN,
(1) if for each i ∈ N, Bi % A, then limBi % A, and
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(2) if for each i ∈ N, A % Bi, then A % limBi.:
Though continuity seems stronger than monotone continuity, in fact the two are equiv-
alent for qualitative probabilities, a point which to our knowledge has not been made
previously. Based on this equivalence, we are justified in writing (monotone) continuity
in stating our results while using continuity in our proofs:
• Continuity Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space, then it satisfies
monotone continuity if and only if it satisfies continuity.
Proof: Because for each sequence (Bi) ∈ AN such that B1 ⊇ B2 ⊇ ..., ∩Bi = limBi,
clearly continuity implies monotone continuity. Suppose % is a qualitative probability
satisfying monotone continuity.
To see that upper contour sets are closed, let A ∈ A and let (Bi) ∈ AN be convergent
such that for each i ∈ N, Bi % A. Define B∞ ≡ limBi. For each i ∈ N, define
Ci ≡ ∪j≥iBj. By construction, C1 ⊇ C2 ⊇ ..., and by monotonicity, for each i ∈ N,
Ci % Bi % A; thus by monotone continuity, ∩Ci % A.
We claim ∩Ci = B∞. Indeed, let s ∈ B∞. Then there is i ∈ N such that j ≥ i implies
s ∈ Bj; thus for each i ∈ N, s ∈ Ci, so s ∈ ∩Ci. Conversely, let s ∈ S\B∞. Then there
is i ∈ N such that j ≥ i implies s 6∈ Bj; thus s 6∈ Ci, so s 6∈ ∩Ci. Thus B∞ = ∩Ci, so
B∞ % A, as desired.
To see that lower contour sets are closed, let A ∈ A and let (Bi) ∈ AN be convergent
such that for each i ∈ N, A % Bi. Define B∞ = limBi. Then (S\B∞) = lim(S\Bi). By
the Complement Lemma, for each i ∈ N, (S\Bi) % (S\A). As upper contour sets are
closed, (S\B∞) % (S\A), so by the Complement Lemma, A % B∞, as desired. 
The Limit-Order Lemma states that for each pair of convergent sequences, if each
member of the first sequence is at least the corresponding member of the second, then
the limit of the first sequence is at least the limit of the second:
• Limit-Order Lemma:31 If (S,A,%) satisfies order and continuity, then for each pair
of convergent sequences (Ai), (Bi) ∈ AN such that for each j ∈ N, Aj % Bj, we have
lim(Ai) % lim(Bi).
Proof: Let (Ai), (Bi) ∈ AN satisfy the hypothesis. Since % is complete, by a standard
argument32 there is M ⊆ N such that that (B′i) ≡ (Bi)|M is a %-monotonic sequence.
Define (A′i) ≡ (Ai)|M . Necessarily lim(Ai) = lim(A′i) and lim(Bi) = lim(B′i).
Case 1: (B′i) is non-decreasing. Then for each pair j, k ∈ N with k ≥ j,
A′k % B′k
% B′j,
so by continuity lim(A′i) % B′j. Thus by continuity, lim(A′i) % lim(B′i), so lim(Ai) %
lim(Bi).
31Variants of this result appear in Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970). This particular result does not
require A to be a σ-algebra; any Hausdorff space will do, as can be seen from the proof.
32A common proof of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem includes a lemma stating that each real se-
quence has a monotonic subsequence; the standard proof of that lemma suffices here.
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Case 2: (B′i) is non-increasing. Then for each pair j, k ∈ N with k ≥ j,
A′j % B′j
% B′k,
so by continuity A′j % lim(B′i). Thus by continuity, lim(A′i) % lim(B′i), so lim(Ai) %
lim(Bi). 
Appendix 2
In this appendix, we prove the Supercabinet Blueprint Lemma.
• Supercabinet Blueprint Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space that
satisfies (monotone) continuity and has a supercabinet, then it has a unique representation
µ ∈Mσ(A).
Proof: Let {Zv}v∈2 ⊆ [A/∼] be a supercabinet.
◦ Step 1: For each k ∈ {0, 1, ...}, there is Z ∈ Z( 1
2
)k such that Z  ∅.
We proceed by induction on k. By [SC1], S ∈ Z1, and by nondegeneracy and mono-
tonicity, S  ∅.
For the inductive hypothesis, assume k ∈ {0, 1, ...} is such that there is Z ∈ Z( 1
2
)k
such that Z  ∅. By [SC2], there are disjoint Z ′, Z ′′ ∈ Z( 1
2
)k+1 such that Z
′ ∪ Z ′′ ∼ Z.
By separability, Z ′  ∅, else ∅ % Z ′ ∪ Z ′′ ∼ Z, contradicting Z  ∅. By induction we are
done. 
◦ Step 2: For each v ∈ 2 such that v > 0, there is Z ∈ Zv such that Z  ∅.
Let v ∈ 2 such that v > 0. Since 2 is dense in [0, 1] there is k ∈ 2 such that v > (1
2
)k.
Since v − (1
2
)k ∈ 2, by [SC2] there are disjoint Z ∈ Z( 1
2
)k and Z
′ ∈ Zv−( 1
2
)k such that
Z ∪ Z ′ ∈ Zv. By Step 1, Z  ∅, and by monotonicity, Z ′ % ∅, so by separability,
Z ∪ Z ′  ∅. 
◦ Step 3: For each pair v, v∗ ∈ 2 such that v∗ > v, each A ∈ Zv∗ , and each B ∈ Zv,
A  B.
Let v, v∗ ∈ 2 such that v∗ > v, let A ∈ Zv∗ , and let B ∈ Zv. Since v∗−v ∈ 2, by [SC2]
there are disjoint Z ∈ Zv and Z ′ ∈ Zv∗−v such that Z ∪ Z ′ ∈ Zv∗ . Since v∗ − v > 0 (and
since Zv∗−v ∈ [A/∼]), by Step 2, Z ′  ∅. Thus by separability, A ∼ Z ∪ Z ′  Z ∼ B. 
◦ Step 4: Define µ : A → [0, 1].
For each v ∈ 2 and each A ∈ Zv, define µ(A) ≡ v.
Let A ∈ A\ ∪v∈2 Zv. Define
2
− ≡ {v ∈ 2|B ∈ Zv implies A % B}, and
2
+ ≡ {v ∈ 2|B ∈ Zv implies B % A}.
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By monotonicity, S % A % ∅, so by [SC1], 0 ∈ 2− and 1 ∈ 2+. By Step 3, for each
pair v, v∗ ∈ 2 such that v∗ > v, (1) v∗ ∈ 2− implies v ∈ 2−\2+, and (2) v ∈ 2+ implies
v∗ ∈ 2+\2−. Thus inf(2+), sup(2−) are defined, and moreover inf(2+) ≥ sup(2−). Since
2
− ∪ 2+ = 2 and 2 is dense in [0, 1], inf(2+) = sup(2−). Define
µ(A) ≡ inf(2+)
= sup(2−). 
◦ Step 5: For each pair A,B ∈ A, µ(A) > µ(B) implies A  B.
Let A,B ∈ A such that µ(A) > µ(B). Since 2 is dense in [0, 1], there are v′, v′′ ∈ 2
such that µ(A) > v′′ > v′ > µ(B). Let Zv′ ∈ Zv′ and Zv′′ ∈ Zv′′ . By Step 3, Zv′′  Zv′ .
If A ∈ ∪Zv, then by construction, A ∈ Zµ(A), so by Step 3, A  Zv′′ . If A 6∈ ∪Zv,
then by construction, inf{v ∈ 2|C ∈ Zv implies C % A} > v′′, so A  Zv′′ .
If B ∈ ∪Zv, then by construction, B ∈ Zµ(B), so by Step 3, Zv′  B. If B 6∈ ∪Zv,
then by construction, v′ > sup{v ∈ 2|C ∈ Zv implies B % C}, so Zv′  B.
Thus A  Zv′′  Zv′  B. 
◦ Step 6: For each pair A,B ∈ A, µ(A) = µ(B) implies A ∼ B.
Let A,B ∈ A such that µ(A) = µ(B). We proceed with three cases whose proofs are
similar.
Case 1: µ(A) = 0. Since 2 is dense in [0, 1], there is decreasing (v+i ) ∈ 2N such that
lim v+i = 0. For each i ∈ N, define v−i ≡ 0. Since lim v+i = lim v−i , by [SC3] there are
convergent (A+i ), (A
−
i ) ∈ AN such that
(i) for each i ∈ N, A+i ∈ Zv+i and A
−
i ∈ Zv−i , and
(ii) limA+i = limA
−
i .
By construction, for each i ∈ N, µ(A+i ) > 0 = µ(A), so by Step 5, A+i  A. Thus by
continuity, limA+i % A. By [SC1], for each i ∈ N, A−i ∼ ∅, so by continuity, limA−i ∼ ∅.
Altogether, ∅ % A, so by monotonicity, A ∼ ∅. By a symmetric argument, B ∼ ∅, so
A ∼ B.
Case 2: µ(A) = 1. Since 2 is dense in [0, 1], there is increasing (v−i ) ∈ 2N such that
lim v−i = 1. For each i ∈ N, define v+i ≡ 1. Since lim v+i = lim v−i , by [SC3] there are
convergent (A+i ), (A
−
i ) ∈ AN such that
(i) for each i ∈ N, A+i ∈ Zv+i and A
−
i ∈ Zv−i , and
(ii) limA+i = limA
−
i .
By construction, for each i ∈ N, µ(A) = 1 > µ(A−i ), so by Step 5, A  A−i . Thus by
continuity, A % limA−i . By [SC1], for each i ∈ N, A+i ∼ S, so by continuity, limA+i ∼ S.
Altogether, A % S, so by monotonicity, A ∼ S. By a symmetric argument, B ∼ S, so
A ∼ B.
Case 3: µ(A) ∈ (0, 1). Since 2 is dense in [0, 1], there are decreasing (v+i ) ∈ 2N
such that lim v+i = µ(A) and increasing (v
−
i ) ∈ 2N such that lim v−i = µ(A). Since
lim v+i = lim v
−
i , by [SC3] there are convergent (A
+
i ), (A
−
i ) ∈ AN such that
(i) for each i ∈ N, A+i ∈ Zv+i and A
−
i ∈ Zv−i , and
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(ii) limA+i = limA
−
i .
By construction, for each i ∈ N, µ(A+i ) > µ(A) > µ(A−i ), so by Step 5, A+i  A  A−i .
Thus by continuity, limA+i % A % limA−i = limA+i , so A ∼ limA+i . By a symmetric
argument, B ∼ limA+i , so A ∼ B. 
◦ Step 7: µ represents %.
Immediate from Step 5 and Step 6. 
◦ Step 8: For each disjoint pair A,B ∈ A, µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1.
Let A,B ∈ A be disjoint. Assume, by way of contradiction, µ(A) + µ(B) > 1. Since
2 is dense in [0, 1], there are v, v′ ∈ 2 such that µ(A) > v, µ(B) > v′, and v + v′ > 1.
Then v > 1 − v′. By [SC2], there are disjoint Zv′ ∈ Zv′ and Z1−v′ ∈ Z1−v′ such that
Zv′ ∪Z1−v′ ∈ Z1. Then Zv′ ∪Z1−v′ ∼ S. Since µ(A) > v > 1− v′ = µ(Z1−v′) and µ(B) >
v′ = µ(Zv′), by Step 7, A  Z1−v′ and B  Zv′ . But then by the Domination Lemma,
A ∪B  Z1−v′ ∪ Zv′ ∼ S, contradicting monotonicity. 
◦ Step 9: For each disjoint pair A,B ∈ ∪Zv, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
Let A,B ∈ ∪Zv be disjoint. By construction, A ∈ Zµ(A) and B ∈ Zµ(B), and by
Step 8, µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1, so by [SC2] and the Domination Lemma, A ∪ B ∈ Zµ(A)+µ(B).
Thus by construction, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B). 
◦ Step 10: For each disjoint pair A,B ∈ A, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
Let A,B ∈ A be disjoint. By Step 8, µ(A) + µ(B) ∈ [0, 1]. We begin by proving that
1 > µ(A) + µ(B) implies µ(A) + µ(B) ≥ µ(A∪B). In this case, since 2 is dense in [0, 1],
there are non-increasing (vi), (wi) ∈ 2N such that
(1) for each i ∈ N, vi ≥ µ(A), wi ≥ µ(B), and 1 ≥ vi + wi; and
(2) lim vi = µ(A) and limwi = µ(B).
By [SC4], there are convergent (Ai), (Bi) ∈ AN such that
(1) for each i ∈ N, Ai ∈ Zvi and Bi ∈ Zwi ; and
(2) for each i ∈ N, Ai ∩Bi = ∅.
Define A∞ ≡ limAi and B∞ ≡ limBi. By definition of µ, for each i ∈ N, µ(Ai) = vi and
µ(Bi) = wi.
Let  > 0. Since lim vi = µ(A) and limwi = µ(B), there is i
∗ ∈ N such that i ≥ i∗
implies µ(A)+ 
2
> vi and µ(B)+

2
> wi. Then i ≥ i∗ implies µ(A)+µ(B)+ > vi+wi =
µ(Ai) + µ(Bi), so by Step 9, i ≥ i∗ implies µ(A) + µ(B) +  > µ(Ai ∪Bi).
By Step 7, A1 % A2 % ... and B1 % B2 % .... Then for each i ∈ N, since A∞ is the
limit of the subsequence (Aj)j≥i, thus by continuity Ai % A∞, and similarly Bi % B∞.
Moreover, for each i ∈ N, Ai∩Bi = ∅; thus by the Domination Lemma, Ai∪Bi % A∞∪B∞,
so by Step 7, µ(Ai ∪Bi) ≥ µ(A∞ ∪B∞).
Altogether, for each  > 0, there is i ∈ N such that µ(A) + µ(B) +  > µ(Ai ∪ Bi) ≥
µ(A∞ ∪B∞); thus µ(A) + µ(B) ≥ µ(A∞ ∪B∞).
By Step 7, for each i ∈ N, Ai % A and Bi % B, so by continuity, A∞ % A and
B∞ % B. Moreover, since for each i ∈ N, Ai ∩ Bi = ∅, thus A∞ ∩ B∞ = ∅, so by
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the Domination Lemma, A∞ ∪ B∞ % A ∪ B. By Step 7 and the previous observation,
µ(A) + µ(B) ≥ µ(A∞ ∪B∞) ≥ µ(A ∪B), as desired.
The argument that µ(A) + µ(B) > 0 implies µ(A ∪ B) ≥ µ(A) + µ(B) is almost
completely symmetric, except that applications of the Domination Lemma involve es-
tablishing that the ‘other’ pair is disjoint, which is straightforward. Altogether, then,
µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B) whether µ(A) + µ(B) is 0, 1, or in between. 
◦ Step 11: µ ∈Mσ(A).
Since µ(S) = 1, by Step 10 and induction, µ ∈ M(A). By Step 7, µ represents %, so
by Theorem V1, µ ∈Mσ(A). 
◦ Step 12: If µ′ ∈Mσ(A) represents %, then µ′ = µ.
If µ′ ∈Mσ(A) represents %, then by [SC1] and [SC2], it is immediate that µ′ must be
defined as in Step 4. 
Appendix 3
In this appendix, we prove our primary lemmas about greedy transforms: the Idempo-
tence Lemma, the 1-AS Lemma, the Greedy Removal Lemma, and the Convergence Lemma.
We abuse language in our informal summaries of these lemmas, writing that an event
satisfies k-AS instead of writing that its associated subspace does.
The Idempotence Lemma states that each greedy transform is idempotent, and for
convenience includes the easy corollary that two images of a greedy transform that are
equally likely are in fact equivalent.
• Idempotence Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying (monotone) continuity, then for each pair A,B ∈ A, GA(GA(B)) =
GA(B). Moreover, for each A ∈ A and each pair B,B′ ∈ A, GA(B) ∼ GA(B′) implies
GA(B) = GA(B′).
Proof: We proceed by induction on s, covering the base case with our inductive hy-
pothesis. Assume s ∈ S is such that for each s′ ∈ S,
GA(GA(B)) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s} = GA(B) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}.
If s ∈ GA(B), then by construction,
GA(B) % [GA(B) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}] ∪ {s}
= [GA(GA(B)) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}] ∪ {s},
so by construction, s ∈ GA(GA(B)).
If s 6∈ GA(B), then by construction,
[GA(GA(B)) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}] ∪ {s} = [GA(B) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}] ∪ {s}
 B
% GA(B),
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so by construction, s 6∈ GA(GA(B)). Thus
GA(GA(B)) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s+ 1} = GA(B) ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s+ 1}.
By induction, GA(GA(B)) = GA(B).
Now assume A ∈ A and B,B′ ∈ A are such that GA(B) ∼ GA(B′). Then GA(B) =
GA(GA(B)) = GA(GA(B′)) = GA(B′), as desired. 
The 1-AS Lemma is the ordinal analogue of Kakeya’s observation (Kakeya, 1914;
Kakeya, 1915): 1-AS of A guarantees that applying A’s greedy transform to an event B
that is no larger than A yields an event as likely as B.
• 1-AS Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satis-
fying (monotone) continuity, then for each A ∈ A such that %|A satisfies 1-AS and each
B ∈ A such that A % B, GA(B) ∼ B.
Proof: If A = ∅ the result is trivial, so assume A 6= ∅. Then by 1-AS, |A| = |N|. For
convenience, re-index S so that (1) A = N, (2) index order is preserved for A, and (3)
members of S\A are not indexed by natural numbers. Since B % GA(B), it suffices to
show GA(B) % B.
Case 1: |A\GA(B)| = 0. Then GA(B) = A % B.
Case 2: 0 < |A\GA(B)| < |N|. Define s∗ ≡ max(A\GA(B)). By construction,
[GA(B)\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...} ∪ {s∗}]  B. Since % |A satisfies 1-AS, thus by separability
GA(B) = [GA(B)\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}
% [GA(B)\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗}
 B.
But this contradicts B % GA(B), so in fact Case 2 is impossible.
Case 3: |A\GA(B)| = |N|. By construction, for each s ∈ A\GA(B), [GA(B)\{s +
1, s+ 2, ...}] ∪ {s}  B. Thus by continuity,
GA(B) = lim
s∈S′\GA(B)
[GA(B)\{s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}] ∪ {s}
% B. 
The Greedy Removal Lemma is the ordinal analogue of Komornik’s observation (Ko-
mornik, 2015): if A is (k+ 1)-AS, then removing an image of its greedy transform yields
a subevent that is k-AS.
• Greedy Removal Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative proba-
bility space satisfying (monotone) continuity, then for each k ∈ N, each A ∈ A such that
%|A satisfies (k + 1)-AS, and each B ∈ A,
%|A\GA(B) satisfies k-AS.
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Proof: Let k ∈ N and assume %|A satisfies k-AS. If A = ∅ or B % A, the result is
trivial, so assume A  B % ∅. By 1-AS, |A| = |N|. For convenience, re-index S so that
(i) A = N, (2) index order is preserved for A, and (iii) members of S\A are not indexed
by natural numbers.
◦ Step 1: If k′ < k + 1 greedy transform sets Gi are iteratively removed from A, and if
A\ ∪Gi is nonempty, then % |A\∪Gi satisfies 1-AS.
Let k′ ∈ N such that k′ < k + 1, and let B1, ..., Bk′ ∈ A. Define A1 ≡ A, and for each
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k′}, define:
• Gi ≡ GAi(Bi),
• Ai+1 ≡ Ai\Gi.
By construction, the Gi are pairwise disjoint. We claim A\ ∪ Gi 6= ∅ implies % |A\∪Gi
satisfies 1-AS. Indeed, let s ∈ A\∪Gi. Since % |A satisfies (k+ 1)-AS, there are pairwise
disjoint B1, ..., Bk+1 ⊆ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...} such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k + 1}, Bi % {s}.
By construction, for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k′}, {s} % Gi ∩ {s + 1, s + 2, ...}. Thus for
each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k′}, Bi % Gi ∩ {s + 1, s + 2, ...}. By repeated application of the
Domination Lemma,
B1 % G1 ∩ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...},
B1 ∪B2 %
(
G1 ∩ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}
) ∪ (G2 ∩ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}),
...
k′⋃
i=1
Bi %
k′⋃
i=1
(
Gi ∩ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}
)
Thus if {s}  [{s + 1, s + 2, ...}\ ∪ Gi], then Bk′+1  [{s + 1, s + 2, ...}\ ∪ Gi], so by
the Domination Lemma,
k′+1⋃
i=1
Bi 
k′⋃
i=1
(
Gi ∩ [A ∩ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}]
) ∪ [{s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}\ ∪Gi]
= {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...},
contradicting monotonicity. Thus [{s + 1, s + 2, ...}\ ∪ Gi] % {s}. Since s ∈ A\Gi was
arbitrary, thus % |A\∪Gi satisfies 1-AS. 
◦ Step 2: Conclude.
Let B ∈ A such that A  B and let G1 = GA(B). Then there is s ∈ A\G1, else by
monotonicity B % G1 = A  B, contradicting B ∼ B. By Step 1, % |A\G1 satisfies 1-AS.
Let s ∈ A\G1 and define A1 ≡ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...}. Then % |A1 satisfies (k + 1)-AS and
% |A1\G1 satisfies 1-AS. Thus there are pairwise disjoint B1, ..., Bk+1 ⊆ A1 such that for
each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k + 1}, Bi % {s}.
Define A2 ≡ A1\G1, and for each i ∈ {2, 3, ..., k + 1}, define:
• Gi ≡ G≤(Ai, {s}),
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• Ai+1 ≡ Ai\Gi.
By construction, the Gi are pairwise disjoint. Assume, by way of contradiction, there is
i ∈ {2, 3, ..., k+ 1} such that {s}  Ai. Let i∗ be the least such i. Then Bi∗ % {s}  Ai∗ ,
and for each i ∈ {1, ..., i∗ − 1}, Bi % {s} % Gi. But then by repeated application of the
Domination Lemma as in Step 1,
i∗−1⋃
i=1
Bi 
i∗−1⋃
i=1
Gi ∪ Ai∗
= A1,
contradicting monotonicity.
Thus for each i ∈ {2, 3, ..., k + 1}, Ai % {s}, so by monotonicity Ai is nonempty, so
by Step 1 % |Ai satisfies 1-AS, so by the 1-AS Lemma Bi ∼ {s}. Since s ∈ A\G1 was
arbitrary, % |A\G1 satisfies k-AS. 
The Convergence Lemma concerns generalized greedy transforms, each of which takes
as input a list of events and outputs the same number of events:
Definition: For each A ∈ A and each k ∈ N, the greedy transform GA : Ak → Ak
is defined as follows. For each (B1, B2, ..., Bk) ∈ Ak, GA(B1, B2, ..., Bk) ∈ Ak is defined
recursively by:
• GA0 (B1, B2, ..., Bk) ≡ ∅, and
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k},
GAi (B1, B2, ..., Bk) ≡ GS\(∪j<iG
A
j (B1,B2,...,Bk)(Ai).
The lemma states that for nice sequences of event lists, the associated sequence of
event lists output by a generalized greedy transform converges.
• Convergence Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying (monotone) continuity, k ∈ N, and (B1i ), (B2i ), ..., (Bki ) ∈ AN are such
that
(1) for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, (Bji ) is monotonic, and
(2) for each i ∈ N, B1i , B2i , ..., Bki are pairwise disjoint,
then for each A ∈ A and each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, (GAj (B1i , B2i , ..., Bki )) ∈ AN is convergent.
Proof: Let A ∈ A, let k ∈ N, and let (B1i ), (B2i ), ..., (Bki ) ∈ AN satisfy the hypotheses.
For each i ∈ N and each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, define Gji ∈ A by:
Gji ≡ GAj (B1i , B2i , ..., Bki ).
To prove (G1i ), (G
2
i ), ..., (G
k
i ) are convergent, we proceed by induction. We cover the base
step with our inductive hypothesis on j∗: assume j∗ ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} is such that for
each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} such that j < j∗, (Gji ) is convergent. We claim (Gj
∗
i ) is convergent.
Within the current inductive argument, we make a second inductive argument. We
cover the base step with our inductive hypothesis on s: assume s ∈ S is such that for
each s′ < s, there is i∗ ∈ N such that for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., j∗}, either
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Figure 4: Euler diagram for A,B,A′, B′. For example, UL ≡ A∩B andD ≡ A′\(B∪B′).
(1) i ≥ i∗ implies s′ ∈ Gji , or
(2) i ≥ i∗ implies s′ ∈ Gji .
By the inductive hypothesis on j∗, there is i∗ ∈ N such that for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} such
that j < j∗, either
(1) i ≥ i∗ implies s ∈ Gji , or
(2) i ≥ i∗ implies s ∈ Gji .
Assume, by way of contradiction, that for each i∗∗ ∈ N there are i1 ≥ i∗∗ and i2 ≥ i∗∗ such
that s ∈ Gj∗i1 and s 6∈ Gj
∗+1
i2
. Then there are i1, i2, i3 ∈ N with i3 > i2 > i1 > i∗ such that
s ∈ Gj∗i1 , s 6∈ Gj
∗
i2
, and s ∈ Gj∗i3 . By definition of i∗, Gj
∗
i1
∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s} = Gj∗i2 ∩ {s′ ∈
S|s′ < s} = Gj∗i3 ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}. Thus by construction, Bj
∗
i1
% Gj∗i1 ∩ {s′ ∈ S|s′ < s} ∪
{s}  Bj∗i2 , so (Bj
∗
i ) is non-increasing. But then B
j∗
i3
% Gj∗i1 ∩{s′ ∈ S|s′ < s}∪{s}  Bj
∗
i2
,
contradicting that (Bj
∗
i ) is non-increasing.
By induction on s, (Gj
∗
i ) is convergent. By induction on j
∗, (G1i ), (G
2
i ), ..., (G
k
i ) are
convergent. 
Appendix 4
In this appendix, we prove our primary lemmas about qualitative halves: the Half-
Equivalence Lemma, the First Halving Lemma, and the Second Halving Lemma.
The Half-Equivalence Lemma states that for any two disjoint pairs whose unions are
equally likely such that each pair’s members are equally likely, all four events are equally
likely.
• Half-Equivalence Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space, then for
each disjoint pair A,A′ ∈ A and each disjoint pair B,B′ ∈ A, if
(1) A ∼ A′,
(2) B ∼ B′, and
(3) A ∪ A′ ∼ B ∪B′,
then A ∼ B.
Proof: For convenience, label the components of the Euler diagram for A,A′, B,B′
according to Figure 4:
Assume, by way of contradiction, A 6∼ B; without loss of generality, assume A  B.
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We claim DL ∪D  UR ∪R. Otherwise, by separability,
B ∼ B′
= DR ∪ (UR ∪R)
% DR ∪ (DL ∪D)
= A′
∼ A,
contradicting A  B.
We claim L ∪R % U ∪D. Otherwise, by separability,
A ∪ A′ = (UL ∪ UR ∪DL ∪DR) ∪ (U ∪D)
 (UL ∪ UR ∪DL ∪DR) ∪ (L ∪R)
= B ∪B′,
contradicting A ∪ A′ ∼ B ∪B′. Similarly, U ∪D % L ∪R, so L ∪R ∼ U ∪D.
But then by separability,
(L ∪R) ∪ (UL ∪ UR) ∼ (U ∪D) ∪ (UL ∪ UR)
= A ∪D
 B ∪D
= (UL ∪ L) ∪ (DL ∪D)
 (UL ∪ L) ∪ (UR ∪R),
contradicting L ∪R ∪ UL ∪ UR ∼ L ∪R ∪ UL ∪ UR. 
The First Halving Lemma states any event satisfying 1-AS can be associated with
two disjoint subevents analogous to its halves:
• First Halving Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying (monotone) continuity, then for each A ∈ A such that A  ∅ and %|A
satisfies 1-AS, there is H ⊆ A such that H ∼ A\H and A  H  ∅.
Proof: Since A 6= ∅, by 1-AS, |A| = |N|. Assume, without loss of generality, A = S = N.
Let C ⊆ [0, 1] be the canonical Cantor set (Cantor, 1883). Define Ψ : A → C by
Ψ(B) =
∑
s∈B
2s
3s
.
It is well-known that Ψ is an order-preserving homeomorphism when A has the lexico-
graphic order >LEX and C has the usual order >; thus each closed collection A′ ⊆ A
contains its >LEX-supremum. Furthermore, for each B ∈ A, Ψ(Bc) = 1−Ψ(B).
Define the collection of events A− ⊆ A by:
A− ≡ {B ∈ A|Bc % B}
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We claim A− is closed. Indeed, let (Bi) ∈ (A−)N be convergent and define B ≡ lim(Bi).
Then
lim(Bci ) = lim(Ψ
−1(Ψ(Bci )))
= lim(Ψ−1(1−Ψ(Bi)))
= Ψ−1(lim(1−Ψ(Bi)))
= Ψ−1(1− lim Ψ(Bi))
= Ψ−1(1−Ψ(B))
= Bc.
Thus (Bi), (B
c
i ) are convergent such that for each i ∈ N, Bci % Bi, so by the Limit-
Order Lemma,
lim(B)c = Bc
= lim(Bci )
% lim(Bi),
and hence lim(Bi) ∈ A−. Thus A− is closed, so it contains its >LEX-supremum H.
Since H = S implies H  Hc, contradicting H ∈ A−, thus Hc 6= ∅. Similarly,
Hc 6= S. Assume, by way of contradiction, |Hc| < |N|. Define s∗ ≡ maxHc. By 1-AS
and separability,
H = [H\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}
% [H\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗}.
Then by the Complement Lemma and separability,
([H\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗})c % Hc
% H
% [H\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗}.
But then [H\{s∗ + 1, s∗ + 2, ...}] ∪ {s∗} ∈ A−, contradicting the >LEX-maximality of H.
Thus |Hc| = |N|.
Finally, for each s ∈ Hc, H ∪ {s} 6∈ A−, else H ∪ {s} would contradict the >LEX-
maximality of H in A−. Thus by the Limit-Order Lemma,
H = lim
s∈Hc
(H ∪ {s})
% lim
s∈Hc
(H ∪ {s})c
= Hc,
and thus H ∼ Hc.
Since A  ∅, necessarily A  H, else H % A and Hc ∼ H % A  ∅, so by the
Domination Lemma, A ∼ H ∪ Hc  A, contradicting A ∼ A. Necessarily H  ∅, else
∅ % H and ∅ % H ∼ Hc, so by the Domination Lemma, ∅ % H ∪Hc ∼ A, contradicting
A  ∅. Thus A  H  ∅. 
The Second Halving Lemma states that under 2-AS, each event can be associated
with two disjoint events analogous to its halves:
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• Second Halving Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability
space satisfying (monotone) continuity and 2-AS, then for each A ∈ A such that A  ∅,
there are disjoint H(A), H ′(A) ∈ A such that
(1) A ∼ H(A) ∪H ′(A), and
(2) A  H(A) ∼ H ′(A)  ∅.
Proof: Let A ∈ A such that A  ∅. Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity,
S % S\A, thus by the 1-AS Lemma, GS(S\A) ∼ S\A. By the Complement Lemma,
(1) S  S\A ∼ GS(S\A), and
(2) S\GS(S\A) ∼ S\(S\A) = A  ∅.
Since % satisfies 2-AS, by the Greedy Removal Lemma, %|S\GS(S\A) satisfies 1-AS. By
the First Halving Lemma, there are disjoint H(A), H ′(A) ⊆ S\GS(S\A) such that
(1) A ∼ S\GS(S\A) = H(A) ∪H ′(A), and
(2) A ∼ S\GS(S\A)  H(A) ∼ H ′(A)  ∅,
as desired. 
Appendix 5
In this appendix, we prove the Supercabinet Construction Lemma and Theorem 1.
• Supercabinet Construction Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued quali-
tative probability space satisfying (monotone) continuity and 3-AS, then it has a super-
cabinet.
Proof: The only notation carried from one step to the next is the notation in the step’s
statement.
◦ Step 1: Define {A1q}q∈{0,1,...}, {H(A1q)}q∈{0,1,...}, {H ′(A1q)}q∈{0,1,...} ⊆ A such that for
each q ∈ {0, 1, ...},
(1) H(A1q) ∩H ′(A1q) = ∅,
(2) A1q ∼ H(A1q) ∪H ′(A1q), and
(3) A1q  A1q+1 ∼ H(A1q) ∼ H ′(A1q)  ∅.
We proceed recursively. Define A10 ≡ GS(S) = S; by monotonicity and nondegeneracy,
A10  ∅.
Suppose we have A1q ∈ A such that A1q  ∅. Since % satisfies 2-AS, by the Sec-
ond Halving Lemma, there are disjoint H(A1q), H
′(A1q) such that
(1) A1q ∼ H(A1q) ∪H ′(A1q), and
(2) A1q  H(A1q) ∼ H ′(A1q)  ∅.
Define A1q+1 ≡ GS(H(A1q)); by the Half-Equivalence Lemma this is well-defined. Since
% satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % H(A1q), thus by the 1-AS Lemma, A1q+1 ∼
H(A1q). 
◦ Step 2: For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...}, define {Apq}q∈{0,1,...,2q} ⊆ A such that for each p ∈
{0, 1, ..., 2q − 1},
Ap+1q ∼ Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q).
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We proceed recursively. For each q ∈ N, define A0q ≡ ∅. For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and
each p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q − 1}, define
Ap+1q ≡ GS
(
Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q)
)
.
Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q), thus by the 1-AS
Lemma, Ap+1q ∼ Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q).
By the Idempotence Lemma, this definition gives the same {A1q}q∈{0,1,...} defined be-
fore. 
◦ Step 3: For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and each p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q}, %|S\Apq satisfies 2-AS.
Let q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q} be such that Apq 6= S. Since % satisfies 3-AS,
thus by the Greedy Removal Lemma and the Idempotence Lemma, %|S\Apq = %|S\GS(Apq)
satisfies 2-AS. 
◦ Step 4: For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...},
(1) p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q − 1} implies GS\Apq (A1q) ∼ A1q, and
(2) p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q} implies Apq = A2pq+1.
We proceed by induction on q. For the base step, let q = 0. Then GS\A0q(A1q) =
GS(S) = S = A1q. For the inductive hypothesis, assume q ∈ {0, 1, ...} is such that for each
p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q − 1}, GS\Apq (A1q) ∼ A1q.
Within the current inductive argument, we make a second inductive argument, on p.
For the base step, A0q = ∅ = A0q+1. For the inductive hypothesis, assume p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q−
1} is such that Apq = A2pq+1. For convenience, define G1, G2, G′2 ∈ A by
• G1 ≡ GS\A
2p
q+1(A1q+1),
• G2 ≡ GS\A
2p+1
q+1 (A1q+1), and
• G′2 ≡ GS\[A
2p
q+1∪G1](A1q+1).
We make three claims, which we prove in sequence:
Claim 1: G1 ∼ A1q+1,
Claim 2: G2 ∼ A1q+1, and
Claim 3: Ap+1q = A
2(p+1)
q+1 .
Proof of Claim 1: By the inductive hypothesis on p, Apq = A
2p
q+1, so by Step 1,
monotonicity, and the inductive hypothesis on q,
S\A2pq+1 = S\Apq
% GS\Apq (A1q)
∼ A1q
 A1q+1.
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Since by Step 3, %|S\A2pq+1 = %|S\Ap satisfies 2-AS, thus by the 1-AS Lemma, G1 =
GS\A2pq+1(A1q+1) ∼ A1q+1.
Proof of Claim 2: Since by Claim 1, H(A1q) ∼ A1q+1 ∼ G1, necessarily S\[A2pq+1 ∪
G1] % H ′(A1q), else by the Domination Lemma, the hypothesis on p, and the hypothesis
on q,
A1q ∼ H(A1q) ∪H ′(A1q)
 G1 ∪ S\[A2pq+1 ∪G1]
= S\A2pq+1
= S\Apq
% GS\Apq (A1q)
∼ A1q,
contradicting A1q ∼ A1q.
By Step 2, A2p+1q+1 ∼ A2pq+1 ∪ G1. By the Complement Lemma, S\A2p+1q+1 ∼ S\[A2pq+1 ∪
G1] % H ′(A1q) ∼ A1q+1. By Step 3, %|S\A2p+1q+1 satisfies 2-AS, so by the 1-AS Lemma,
G2 = GS\A
2p+1
q+1 (A1q+1) ∼ A1q+1.
Proof of Claim 3: As argued in the proof of Claim 2, S\[A2pq+1 ∪G1] % H ′(A1q) ∼
A1q+1. By Step 3, %|S\A2pq+1 satisfies 2-AS, so by the Greedy Removal Lemma, %|(S\A2pq+1)\G1 =
%|S\[A2pq+1∪G1] satisfies 1-AS. Thus by the 1-AS Lemma, G
′
2 ∼ A1q+1.
Since H(A1q) ∼ G1 and H ′(A1q) ∼ G′2, thus by the Domination Lemma, A1q ∼ H(A1q)∪
H ′(A1q) ∼ G1 ∪G′2. By the hypothesis on q, GS\A
p
q (A1q) ∼ A1q ∼ G1 ∪G′2. By Step 2, the
hypothesis on p, and separability,
Ap+1q ∼ Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q)
= A2pq+1 ∪ GS\A
p
q (A1q)
∼ A2pq+1 ∪ (G1 ∪G′2)
= [A2pq+1 ∪G1] ∪G′2
By Step 2, A2pq+1 ∪G1 ∼ A2p+1q+1 . By the first paragraph of this claim’s proof and Claim 2,
G′2 ∼ A1q+1 ∼ G2. Thus by the Domination Lemma, [A2pq+1 ∪G1] ∪G′2 ∼ A2p+1q+1 ∪G2. By
Step 2, A2p+1q+1 ∪G2 ∼ A2p+2q+1 . Altogether, Ap+1q ∼ A2p+2q+1 .
By induction on p, we conclude the following: if q ∈ {0, 1, ...} is such that for each
p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q − 1}, GS\Apq (A1q) ∼ A1q, then
(1) for each p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q+1 − 1}, GS\Apq+1(A1q+1) ∼ A1q+1, and
(2) for each p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q}, Apq = A2pq+1.
By induction on q, we are done. 
◦ Step 5: For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and each p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q}, Apq ∼ S\A2q−pq .
Let q ∈ {0, 1, ...}. For each p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q}, define Bpq ≡ S\A2q−pq . We proceed by
induction on p.
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For the base step, let p = 0. By Step 4, Bpq = S\A2qq = S\A10 = S\S = ∅, so A0q ∼ B0q .
For the inductive hypothesis, assume p ∈ {0, 1, .., 2q − 1} is such that Apq ∼ Bpq .
Define A,B,C ′, B′, A′ ∈ A by:
A ≡ Apq ,
B ≡ GS\A(A1q),
C ′ ≡ A2q−(p+1)q
B′ ≡ GS\C′(A1q)
A′ ≡ S\(C ′ ∪B′)
By Step 2, C ′ ∪ B′ ∼ A2q−pq . By the Complement Lemma, A′ = S\(C ′ ∪ B′) ∼
S\A2q−pq = Bpq . By the hypothesis on p, A′ ∼ Apq = A. By Step 4, B ∼ A1q ∼ B′. Thus
by the Domination Lemma, A ∪B ∼ A′ ∪B′.
By Step 2, A ∪ B ∼ Ap+1q , and by definition, A′ ∪ B′ = S\A2
q−(p+1)
q = Bp+1q , so
altogether Ap+1q ∼ Bp+1q . By induction on p, we are done. 
◦ Step 6: Define the binary operation ⊎.
For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and each pair p, p′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q} such that p + p′ ≤ 2q, define
Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q ∈ A by:
Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q ≡ GS
(
Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′
q )
)
. 
◦ Step 7: For each q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and each pair p, p′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q} such that p+ p′ ≤ 2q,
Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q′ = A
p+p′
q .
Let q ∈ {0, 1, ...} and let p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q}. We proceed by induction on p′. For the
base step, let p′ = 0. Then by the Idempotence Lemma, Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q = GS(Apq) = Apq .
For the inductive hypothesis, assume p′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., [2q−1]−p} is such that Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q =
Ap+p
′
q . Define A,B,C ∈ A by:
A ≡ Apq ,
B ≡ GS\A(Ap′q ), and
C ≡ GS\(A∪B)(A1q).
By hypothesis, Ap+p
′
q = A
p
q
⊎
Ap
′
q = GS(A∪B). Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonic-
ity, S % A∪B, thus by the 1-AS Lemma, GS(A∪B) ∼ A∪B. Altogether, Ap+p′q ∼ A∪B.
By monotonicity and Step 4, S\Ap+p′q % GS\A
p+p′
q (A1q) ∼ A1q, so by the Comple-
ment Lemma, S\(A ∪ B) ∼ S\Ap+p′q % A1q. By Step 3, %|S\A satisfies 2-AS, so by the
Greedy Removal Lemma, %(S\A)\B = %S\(A∪B) satisfies 1-AS. Thus by the 1-AS Lemma,
A1q ∼ C. By Step 4, GS\A
p+p′
q (A1q) ∼ A1q, so GS\A
p+p′
q (A1q) ∼ C.
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Since Ap+p
′
q ∼ A ∪ B and GS\A
p+p′
q (A1q) ∼ C, thus by Step 2 and the Domina-
tion Lemma,
Ap+p
′+1
q ∼ Ap+p
′
q ∪ GS\A
p+p′
q (A1q)
∼ (A ∪B) ∪ C.
By Step 5, S\Apq ∼ A2q−pq . Since 2q − p ≥ p′ + 1, by Step 2 and monotonicity,
A2
q−p
q % Ap
′+1
q , so S\Apq % Ap′+1q . By Step 3, %|S\Apq satisfies 2-AS, so by the 1-AS
Lemma, GS\Apq (Ap′+1q ) ∼ Ap′+1q .
Since S\Apq % Ap′+1q , by Step 2 and monotonicity, S\Apq % Ap′q . By Step 3, %|S\Apq
satisfies 2-AS, so by the 1-AS Lemma, Ap
′
q ∼ B. By Step 4, GS\A
p′
q (A1q) ∼ A1q, and as
argued above, A1q ∼ C, so GS\A
p′
q (A1q) ∼ C. Thus by Step 2 and the Domination Lemma,
Ap
′+1
q ∼ Ap′q ∪ GS\A
p′
q (A1q) ∼ B ∪ C.
Altogether, GS\Apq (Ap′+1q ) ∼ B ∪ C. Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity,
S % Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′+1
q ), thus by the 1-AS Lemma and separability,
Apq
⊎
Ap
′+1
q = GS
(
Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′+1
q )
)
∼ Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′+1
q )
∼ Apq ∪ (B ∪ C)
= A ∪ (B ∪ C).
Since (A∪B)∪C = A∪(B∪C), thus Ap+p′+1q ∼ Apq
⊎
Ap
′+1
q . By the Idempotence Lemma,
Ap+p
′+1
q = A
p
q
⊎
Ap
′+1
q .
By induction on p′, for each p′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q−1}, Apq
⊎
Ap
′
q = A
p+p′
q . Since q ∈ {0, 1, ...}
and p ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2q} were arbitrary, we are done. 
◦ Step 8: limA1q = ∅.
By Step 2, monotonicity, and the Convergence Lemma, (A1q) ∈ AN is convergent.
Assume, by way of contradiction, there is s ∈ limA1q.
We claim for each i ∈ N and each k ∈ N, A1i  {s, s + 1, ..., s + k}. We proceed by
induction on k. For the base step, let k = 0. Then by continuity and monotonicity, for
each i ∈ N, A1i % limA1q % {s}, so by Step 1, A1i  A1i+1 % {s}.
For the inductive hypothesis, assume k ∈ N is such that for each i ∈ N, A1i 
{s, s + 1, ..., s + k}. Let i ∈ N. By Step 1, H(A1i ) ∼ A1i+1. By Step 4 and Step 1,
H ′(A1i+1) ∼ A1i+1 ∼ GS\A
1
i+1(A1i+1). By the inductive hypothesis, A
1
i+1  {s, s+1, ..., s+k}.
By Step 4 and the inductive hypothesis, GS\A1i+1(A1i+1) ∼ A1i+1  {s} % {s+k+1}. Thus
by Step 1 and two applications of the Domination Lemma,
A1i ∼ H(A1i ) ∪H ′(A1i )
∼ A1i+1 ∪ GS\A
1
i+1(A1i+1)
 {s, s+ 1, ..., s+ k} ∪ {s+ k + 1}.
Since i ∈ N was arbitrary, for each i ∈ N, A1i  {s, s+ 1, ..., s+ k + 1}. By induction on
k, we are done.
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Thus by continuity, for each i ∈ N, A1i % lim{s, s + 1, ..., s + k} = {s, s + 1, ...}. If
s = 1, then by Step 1, S = A10  A11 % {1, 2, ...} = S, contradicting S ∼ S. Thus s > 1,
so by 2-AS, for each i ∈ N, A1i  {s, s+ 1, ...} % {s− 1}.
Thus for each s ∈ S, if for each i ∈ N, A1i  {s}, then (1) s 6= 1, and (2) for each
i ∈ N, A1i  {s− 1}. Then there can be no such s, contradicting that there is. 
◦ Step 9: Define {Av}v∈2 ⊆ A and {Zv}v∈2 ⊆ [A/∼] such that for each pair v, v′ ∈ 2
such that v′ > v, Av′  Av.
Let v ∈ 2. Then there are p, q ∈ {0, 1, ...} such that p ≤ 2q and v = p
2q
. Define
Av ≡ Apq , and
Zv ≡ {A ∈ A|A ∼ Av}.
By Step 4, this is well-defined.
Let v, v′ ∈ 2 such that v′ > v. Since v′ − v > 0, by Step 1, Step 2, and monotonicity,
Av′−v  ∅. Similarly, A1−v  ∅. By Step 5, S\Av ∼ A1−v  ∅, so GS\Av(Av′−v)  ∅.
Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % Av ∪ GS\Av(Av′−v), thus by the 1-AS
Lemma, GS(Av ∪ GS\Av(Av′−v)) ∼ Av ∪ GS\Av(Av′−v). Thus by Step 6, Av′ = GS(Av ∪
GS\Av(Av′−v)
) ∼ Av ∪ GS\Av(Av′−v), so by separability, Av′  Av. 
◦ Step 10: For each convergent pair (vi), (v′i) ∈ 2N such that lim vi = lim vi, if (Avi), (Av′i) ∈AN are convergent, then limAvi ∼ limAv′i .
Define v∞ ≡ lim vi = lim v′i, A∞ ≡ limAvi , and A′∞ ≡ limAv′i . Let v ∈ 2. If v > v∞,
then there is v′ ∈ 2 such that v > v′ > v∞. Since lim vi = v∞, there is i∗ ∈ N such that
for each i ≥ i∗, v′ > vi. Thus for each i ≥ i∗, Av′  Avi , so by Step 9 and continuity,
Av  Av′ % A∞. By the same argument, v > v∞ implies Av  A′∞.
Similarly, for each v ∈ 2, v∞ > v implies A∞  Av and A′∞  Av.
Assume, by way of contradiction, A∞ 6∼ A′∞. Assume, without loss of generality,
A∞  A′∞. Define G ≡ GS(A′∞). Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % A′∞,
thus by the 1-AS Lemma, A∞  A′∞ ∼ G.
Necessarily S\G  ∅, else by the Complement Lemma and monotonicity, G % S %
A∞, contradicting A∞  G. Then there is q ∈ N such that S\G  A1q, else by Step 8
and continuity, ∅ = limA1q % S\G, contradicting S\G  ∅.
Since % satisfies 3-AS, thus by the Greedy Removal Lemma, %|S\G satisfies 2-AS,
so by Step 1 and the 1-AS Lemma, for each q′ ∈ N such that q′ ≥ q, GS\G(A1q′) ∼ A1q′ .
Then by Step 1, (GS\G(A1q′)) ∈ AN is monotonic, so by the Convergence Lemma, it is
convergent. By the Limit-Order Lemma and Step 8, limGS\G(A1q′) ∼ limA1q′ = ∅, so
limGS\G(A1q′) = ∅. Then limG ∪ GS\G(A1q′) = G. Thus there is q∗ ∈ N such that (1)
q∗ ≥ q and thus GS\G(A1q∗) ∼ A1q∗ , and (2) A∞  G ∪ GS\G(A1q∗), else by continuity
G % A∞, contradicting A∞  G.
We proceed by reaching a contradiction in three cases:
Case 1: v∞ = 0. Then since
1
2q∗
> v∞, by monotonicity, A1q∗  A∞  G ∪
GS\G(A1q∗) % GS\G(A1q∗) ∼ A1q∗ , contradicting A1q∗ ∼ A1q∗ .
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Case 2: v∞ = 1. Since v∞ >
2q
∗ − 1
2q∗
, G ∼ A′∞  A2
q∗−1
q∗ . Since GS\G(A1q∗) ∼
A1q∗ % GS\A
2q
∗−1
q∗ (A1q∗), thus by the Domination Lemma, A∞  G ∪ GS\G(A1q∗)  A2
q∗−1
q∗ ∪
GS\A2
q∗−1
q∗ (A1q∗). Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % A2
q∗−1
q∗ ∪GS\A
2q
∗−1
q∗ (A1q∗),
thus by the 1-AS Lemma, A2
q∗−1
q∗ ∪ GS\A
2q
∗−1
q∗ (A1q∗) ∼ A2
q∗−1
q∗
⊎
A1q∗ . But then by Step 7,
Step 4, and Step 1, A∞  A2q
∗−1
q∗
⊎
A1q∗ = A
2q
∗
q∗ = S, contradicting S % A∞.
Case 3: v∞ ∈ (0, 1). Define ∗ ≡ 1
2q∗
. Since 2 is dense in [0, 1], there is v∗ ∈ 2 such
that 1 ≥ v∗ + ∗ > v∞ > v∗. Then Av∗+∗  A∞  G ∼ A′∞  Av∗ .
Since 1 − v∗ ≥ ∗, thus by Step 5, S\Av∗ ∼ A1−v∗ % A∗ = A1q∗ . Then by Step 3
and the 1-AS Lemma, GS\G(A1q∗) ∼ A1q∗ ∼ GS\Av∗ (A1q∗). Since G  Av∗ , thus by the
Domination Lemma, A∞  G ∪ GS\G(A1q∗)  Av∗ ∪ GS\Av∗ (A1q∗).
Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % Av∗ ∪GS\Av∗ (A1q∗), thus by the 1-AS
Lemma, Av∗
⊎
A∗ = Av∗ ∪ GS\Av∗ (A1q∗). But then by Step 7, A∞  Av∗
⊎
A∗ = Av∗+∗ ,
contradicting Av∗+∗  A∞. 
◦ Step 11: Conclude.
We verify that {Zv}v∈2 satisfies [SC1], [SC2], [SC3], and [SC4].
SC1: By Step 1 and Step 9, ∅ = A0 ∈ Z0 and S = A1 ∈ Z1.
SC2: Let v, v′ ∈ 2 such that v + v′ ≤ 1. Then there are p, p′, q ∈ {0, 1, ...} such that
v =
p
2q
and v′ =
p′
2q
, and p+ p′ ≤ 2q.
By construction, Apq ∈ Zv, Ap′q ∈ Zv′ , and Ap+p′q ∈ Zv+v′ . By Step 5, S\Apq ∼ A2q−pq .
Since p + p′ ≤ 2q, thus by monotonicity and Step 2, S\Apq % Ap′q . By Step 3, %|S\Apq
satisfies 2-AS, so by the 1-AS Lemma,
GS\Apq (Ap′q ) ∼ Ap
′
q .
Thus we have disjoint Apq ∈ Zv and GS\A
p
q (Ap
′
q ) ∈ Zv′ .
Since % satisfies 1-AS and, by monotonicity, S % Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′
q ), thus by the 1-AS
Lemma, GS(Apq ∪ GS\Apq (Ap′q )) ∼ Apq ∪ GS\Apq (Ap′q ). Thus by Step 7,
Ap+p
′
q = A
p
q
⊎
Ap
′
q
= GS(Apq ∪ GS\Apq (Ap′q ))
∼ Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′
q ),
so Apq ∪ GS\A
p
q (Ap
′
q ) ∈ Zv+v′ .
SC3: Let (v+i ) ∈ 2N be non-increasing and let (v+i ) ∈ 2N be non-decreasing such that
lim v+i = lim v
−
i .
(i) for each i ∈ N, vi + wi ≤ 1 and v′i + w′i ≤ 1, and
(ii) lim vi = lim v
′
i and limwi = limw
′
i.
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For each i ∈ N, define Ai ≡ Avi and A′i ≡ Av′i . Then for each i ∈ N, Ai ∈ Zvi , A′i ∈ Zv′i .
By Step 9, (Ai) and (A
′
i) are monotonic, so by the Convergence Lemma, (Ai) and (A
′
i)
are convergent, so by Step 10, limAi ∼ limA′i.
SC4: Let (vi), (wi) ∈ 2N be monotonic such that for each i ∈ N, vi + wi ≤ 1. For
each i ∈ N, define Ai ≡ Avi and Bi ≡ GS\Ai(Awi).
By Step 5, for each i ∈ N, S\Ai ∼ A1−vi , so since 1−vi ≥ wi, by Step 9, S\Avi % Awi .
Thus by Step 3 and the 1-AS Lemma, for each i ∈ N, Bi ∼ Awi . Altogether, for each
i ∈ N, Ai and Bi are disjoint with Ai ∈ Zvi and Bi ∈ Zwi .
By Step 9, (Ai) and (Bi) are monotonic, and by construction, for each i ∈ N, Ai
and Bi are disjoint; thus by the Convergence Lemma, (GS1 (Ai, Bi)) and (GS2 (Ai, Bi)) are
convergent. By the Idempotence Lemma, these are, respectively (Ai) and (Bi). 
• Theorem 1: If (S,A,%) is a purely-σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satis-
fying (monotone) continuity and 3-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Proof: The result follows immediately from the Supercabinet Construction Lemma and
the Supercabinet Blueprint Lemma. 
Appendix 6
In this appendix, we prove the Carving Lemma and Theorem 2.
Theorem KK is an implication of the cardinal analogue of the 1-AS Lemma (Kakeya,
1914; Kakeya, 1915) and the cardinal analogue of the Greedy Removal Lemma (Komornik,
2015). It provides conditions for a sequence of numbers to have k disjoint subsequences
whose sums correspond to a given list v1, v2, ..., vk:
Definition: A sequence (µi) ∈ [0, 1]N is k-Kakeya if
(i) (µi) is non-increasing,
(ii) limµi = 0, and
(iii) for each i ∈ N, ∑j>i µj ≥ kµi.
• Theorem KK (Kakeya, 1914; Kakeya, 1915; Komornik, 2015): For each k-
Kakeya (µi) ∈ [0, 1]N and each v1, v2, ..., vk ∈ [0,
∑
µi] such that v1 + v2 + ...+ vk ≤
∑
µi,
there are pairwise disjoint A1, A2, ..., Ak ⊆ N such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k},∑
Ak
µi = vk.
The Carving Lemma states that if a first event that contains no atoms is at least as
likely as a second event, then the first contains a subevent that is as likely as the second.
• Carving Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
(monotone) continuity, then for each pair A,B ∈ A such that A ∈ A◦ and A % B, there
is B′ ⊆ A such that B′ ∈ A and B′ ∼ B.
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Proof: Let (S,A,%), A, B satisfy the hypotheses. If A ∼ B, then define B′ ≡ A and
we are done; if ∅ ∼ B, then define B′ ≡ ∅ and we are done; thus assume A  B  ∅. By
monotonicity, S◦ % A  ∅.
For each pair C,C ′ ∈ A◦, define C %◦ C ′ if and only if C % C ′. Since S◦  ∅,
it is straightforward to verify that (S◦,A◦,%◦) is an atomless qualitative probability
space satisfying monotone continuity, so by Theorem V2, it has a unique representation
µ◦ ∈Mσ(A◦) that is infinitely-divisible.
Define V +, V − ⊆ [0, µ◦(A)] by:
V + ≡ {v ∈ [0, µ◦(A)]|C ∈ A◦ and µ◦(C) = v implies C % B}, and
V − ≡ {v ∈ [0, µ◦(A)]|C ∈ A◦ and µ◦(C) = v implies B % C}.
Since A  B  ∅, thus µ◦(A) ∈ V + and 0 ∈ V −, so inf V + and supV − are well-defined.
Since µ◦ is infinitely-divisible, V + ∪ V − = [0, µ◦(A)]. Moreover, since µ◦ represents %◦,
for each pair v, v′ ∈ [0, 1] (i) v ∈ V + and v′ > v implies v′ ∈ V +, and (ii) v ∈ V − and
v′ < v implies v′ ∈ V −. Altogether, inf V + = supV −; define v∗ ≡ inf V + = supV −.
Since µ◦ is infinitely-divisible, there is B′ ∈ A◦ such that µ◦(B′) = v∗.
First, assume v∗ 6= µ◦(A). Since µ◦ is infinitely-divisible, there is (Ai) ∈ (A◦)N such
that
(1) for each i ∈ N, µ◦(Ai) = v∗ + (12)i(µ◦(A)− v∗), and
(2) A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ ...
By (2), there is A∞ ≡ lim(Ai). For each i ∈ N, vi > v∗, so vi ∈ V +, so Ai % B;
thus by continuity, A∞ % B. Since µ◦ is σ-additive, by (1) µ◦(A∞) = v∗, so B′ ∼ A∞.
Altogether, v∗ 6= 0 implies B′ % B.
By a symmetric argument, v∗ 6= 0 implies B % B′. We cannot have that v∗ = 0,
else ∅ ∼ B′ % B, contradicting B  ∅. Similarly, we cannot have that v∗ = µ◦(A), else
B % B′ ∼ A, contradicting A  B. Thus v∗ ∈ (0, µ◦(A)), so B′ ∼ B as desired. 
• Theorem 2: If (S,A,%) is a finitely-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
(monotone) continuity and 3-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Proof: If S⊕ = ∅, then we are done by Theorem V2, so assume S⊕ 6= ∅.
◦ Step 1: Define µ◦.
For each pair A,B ⊆ S◦, define A %◦ B if and only if A % B. Since % satisfies
3-AS and monotonicity, thus S◦  ∅, so S◦ ◦ ∅. It is immediate that (S◦,A◦,%◦) is an
atomless qualitative probability space satisfying monotone continuity, so by Theorem V2,
it has a unique representation µ◦ ∈Mσ(A◦), and µ◦ is infinitely-divisible.
◦ Step 2: Construct (A′i) ∈ AN partitioning S, and the σ-algebra A′ ⊆ A.
To define (A′i) ∈ AN, we first define (Ai) ∈ AN. For each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., |I|}, define Ai ≡
{i}. Since S\(∪j≤|I|Aj) = S◦, thus by 3-AS and separability, S\(∪j≤|I|Aj)  A|I|  ∅.
Clearly, S\(∪j≤|I|Aj) ∈ A◦.
Let A|I|+1 ⊆ S◦ such that S◦  A|I|  A|I|+1  ∅; we can do this by the Carv-
ing Lemma and infinite-divisibility of µ◦. By the Complement Lemma, S\(∪j≤|I|+1Aj) =
S◦\A|I|+1  ∅, and clearly, S\(∪j≤|I|+1Aj) ∈ A◦.
For the recursive step, assume we have defined A1, A2, ..., Ai ∈ A such that
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(i) (S\ ∪j≤i Aj)  ∅, and
(ii) (S\ ∪j≤i Aj) ∈ A◦.
Since (S\∪j≤iAj) ⊆ S◦ and µ◦ is infinitely-divisible, thus (S\∪j≤iAi) can be partitioned
into B1, B2, B3, B4 that are equally-likely, according to both %◦ and %.
If Ai % B1, then define Ai+1 ≡ B1. Then (S\ ∪j≤i+1 Aj) = B2 ∪ B3 ∪ B4, which by
separability and monotonicity is not null. Clearly, (S\ ∪j≤i Aj) ∈ A◦.
If B1  Ai, then by the Carving Lemma, there is C ⊆ B1 such that C ∼◦ Ai, and
thus C ∼ Ai. Then (S\ ∪j≤i+1 Aj) contains B2 ∪ B3 ∪ B4, and thus by separability and
monotonicity is not null.
Consider (Aj)j>|I|, which by construction are pairwise-disjoint. We cannot have that
A|I|+1 ∼ A|I|+2 ∼ ..., else µ◦(A|I|+1) = µ◦(A|I|+2) = ..., so µ◦(∪j>|I|Aj) > 1, contradicting
that µ◦ ∈ Mσ(A◦). Thus there is some smallest i∗ ∈ {|I| + 1, |I| + 2, ...} such that
Ai∗  Ai∗+1. By construction, µ◦(Ai∗+1) = 14µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj). Moreover, for each i ≥ i∗
such that µ◦(Ai+1) = 14µ
◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i Aj), by construction Ai+1  Ai+2 and µ◦(Ai+2) =
1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i Aj). Altogether, there is i∗ ∈ {|I|+ 1, |I|+ 2, ...} such that for each i ≥ i∗,
µ◦(Ai+1) = 14µ
◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i Aj). It follows from the additivity of µ◦ that∑
j>i∗
µ◦(Aj) =
1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj) + 1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗+1 Aj) + 1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗+2 Aj) + ...
=
1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj) + 3
4
1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj) + (3
4
)2
1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj) + ...
=
1
4
µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj)
∞∑
i=0
(
3
4
)k
= µ◦(S◦\ ∪j≤i∗ Aj)
Since j ≤ |I| implies Aj ∩ S◦ = ∅, thus∑
j>i∗
µ◦(Aj) = µ◦(S◦\ ∪i∗≥j>|I| Aj).
Moreover, since (Ai) is pairwise-disjoint and since j > |I| implies Aj ⊆ S◦, thus by
additivity of µ◦,
µ◦(S◦\ ∪ Aj) = µ◦(S◦)−
∑
j>|I|
µ◦
= µ◦(S◦)− [
∑
i∗≥j>|I|
µ◦(Aj) +
∑
j>i∗
µ◦(Aj)]
= µ◦(S◦)− [µ◦(∪i∗≥j>|I|)Aj + µ◦(S◦\ ∪i∗≥j>|I| Aj)]
= µ◦(S◦)− µ◦(S◦) = 1− 1 = 0.
Since µ◦ represents %◦, thus (S◦\ ∪ Aj) is null, according to both %◦ and %.
Define A′1 ≡ A1∪ (S◦\∪Aj), and for each i ∈ N\{1}, define A′i ≡ Ai. By separability,
for each i ∈ N, A′i ∼ Ai. By construction, (A′i) partitions S, with (A′i)i≤|I| partitioning
S⊕ and (A′i)i>|I| partitioning S
◦.
Define A′ ⊆ A to be the σ-algebra generated by (A′i): A′ ∈ A′ if and only if there is
J ⊆ N such that A′ = ∪i∈JA′i.
◦ Step 3: (µ◦(A′i))i>|I| is 3-Kakeya.
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Throughout this step, we use the index set {|I|+ 1, |I|+ 2, ...}, and we suppress it for
convenience. By construction, (A′i) is non-increasing in likelihood, so since µ
◦ represents
%◦, thus (µ◦(A′i)) is non-increasing. Moreover, (µ◦(A′i)) is bounded, so it is convergent.
We cannot have limµ◦(A′i) > 0, else
∑
µ◦(A′i) =∞, which since µ◦ is σ-additive implies
µ◦(S◦) = µ◦(∪A′i) =
∑
µ◦(A′i) =∞, contradicting µ◦(S◦) = 1. Thus limµ◦(A′i) = 0.
Let i > |I|. By construction, µ◦(A′i) ≤ 14µ◦(S◦\ ∪j<i A′j). Since (A′i) partitions S◦,
µ◦(S◦\∪j<iA′j) = µ◦(∪j≥iA′j), so by σ-additivity of µ◦, µ◦(A′i) ≤ 14
(
µ◦(A′i)+
∑
j>i µ
◦(A′j)
)
.
Rearranging,
∑
j>i µ
◦(A′j) ≥ 3µ◦(A′i). Since i > |I| was arbitrary, we are done. 
◦ Step 4: Define (S∗,A∗,%∗), Ψ∗ : A∗ → A′, and Ψ′ : A′ → A∗.
Define S∗ ≡ {1, 2, ...} and define A∗ ≡ 2S. Define Ψ∗ : A∗ → A′ as follows: for each
A∗ ∈ A∗,
Ψ∗(A∗) = ∪i∈A∗A′i.
For each pair A,B ∈ A∗, define
A %∗ B if and only if Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(B).
Clearly, Ψ∗ is a bijection that preserves disjoint unions: if A,B ∈ A∗ are disjoint, then
Ψ∗(A),Ψ∗(B) ∈ A′ are disjoint.
Let Ψ′ : A′ → A∗ be the inverse of Ψ∗; clearly, Ψ′ preserves disjoint unions.
◦ Step 5: Verify (S∗,A∗,%∗) is a purely-catalogued qualitative probability space satis-
fying monotone continuity and 3-AS.
We verify each property in sequence:
Order: To see that %∗ is complete, let A,B ∈ A∗. Since % is complete, Ψ∗(A) %
Ψ∗(B); thus A %∗ B as desired.
To see that %∗ is transitive, let A,B,C ∈ A∗ such that A %∗ B and B %∗ C. Then
Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(B) and Ψ∗(B) % Ψ∗(C), so by transitivity of %, Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(C); thus
A %∗ C as desired.
Separability: Let A,B,C ∈ A∗ such that A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅. Since Ψ∗ preserves
disjoint pairs, Ψ∗(A)∩Ψ∗(C) = Ψ∗(B)∩Ψ∗(C) = ∅. Since % is separable, Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(B)
if and only if Ψ∗(A)∪Ψ∗(C) % Ψ∗(B)∪Ψ∗(C); thus A %∗ B if and only if A∪C %∗ B∪C,
as desired.
Monotonicity: Let A,B ∈ A with A ⊆ B. Then Ψ∗(A) ⊆ Ψ∗(B). Since % is
monotonic, Ψ∗(B) % Ψ∗(A); thus B %∗ A, as desired.
Nondegeneracy: Since (Ai) partitions S, thus Ψ
∗(S∗) = S, and clearly Ψ∗(∅) = ∅.
Since % is monotonic and nondegenerate, S  ∅, so Ψ∗(S∗)  Ψ∗(∅), so S∗ ∗ ∅, as
desired.
Continuity: Let A ∈ A∗ and let (Bi) ∈ (A∗)N be convergent. Define B ≡ limBi.
Clearly, (Ψ∗(Bi)) is convergent with Ψ∗(B) = lim Ψ∗(Bi).
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If for each i ∈ N, Bi %∗ A, then for each i ∈ N, Ψ∗(Bi) % Ψ∗(A). Since % is
continuous, Ψ∗(B) % Ψ∗(A); thus B %∗ A, as desired.
If for each i ∈ N, A %∗ Bi, then by a similar argument A %∗ B, as desired.
3-AS: Let A ∈ A∗ be an atom. By construction, separability, and monotonicity, there
is s∗ ∈ S∗ such that A = {s∗}. Then Ψ∗({s∗}) = A′s∗ .
Case 1: s∗ ≤ |I|. Then A′s∗ is an atom. Since % satisfies 3-AS, there are
(i) pairwise-disjoint B ⊆ (↓ A′s∗), and
(ii) B1,B2,B3 ⊆ B′ partitioning B,
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (∪Bi) % Ψ∗(A).
For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define B⊕i ≡ (∪Bi) ∩ S⊕, define B◦i ≡ (∪Bi) ∩ S◦, and define
vi ≡ µ◦(Bi). Since µ◦(B1 ∪ B2 ∪ B3) ≤ 1 and µ◦ is additive, thus v1 + v2 + v3 ≤ 1 =
µ◦(S◦) =
∑
i>|I| µ
◦(A′i). By Step 3 and Theorem KK, there are disjoint J1, J2, J3 ⊆ N
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∑j∈Ji µ◦(A′j) = vi.
For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define
B′i ≡ {A′j ∈ A′|A′j ∈ B⊕i or j ∈ Ji},
B′ ≡ ∪B′i,
B∗i ≡ {Ψ′(B)|B ∈ B′i}, and
B∗ ≡ ∪B∗i .
By construction, B′ is pairwise-disjoint. Let B ∈ B′. If B ∈ ∪B⊕i , then B ∈ (↓ A′s∗) by
construction. If there is j ∈ ∪Ji such that B = A′j, then A′s∗ % A′|I|  A′|I|+1 % A′j = B,
so B ∈ (↓ A′s∗). Altogether, B′ ⊆ (↓ A′s∗). Clearly, B′1,B′2,B′3 partition B′.
Let i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define B′i ≡ ∪j∈JiA′j. Since µ◦ is σ-additive, µ◦(B′i) = vi, so B′i ∼ Bi,
so by the Domination Lemma twice, (∪B′i) = B⊕i ∪B′i ∼ B⊕i ∪B◦i = (∪Bi); thus (∪B′i) %
A′s∗ .
Since Ψ′ preserves disjoint pairs, thus (i) B∗ is pairwise-disjoint, (ii) B∗ ⊆ (↓ {s∗})
(for %∗), (iii) B∗1,B∗2,B∗3 partition B∗, and (iv) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (∪B∗i ) %∗ A. Since
A was an arbitrary atom, we are done.
Case 2: s∗ > |I|. By Step 3, there is s∗∗ ≥ s∗ such that µ◦(As∗) = µ◦(A′s∗∗) >
µ◦(A′s∗∗+1). By Step 3 and Theorem KK, there are disjoint J1, J2, J3 ⊆ {s∗∗, s∗∗ + 1, ...}
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∑j∈Ji µ◦(A′j) = µ◦(A′s∗).
For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define
B′i ≡ {A′j ∈ A′|j ∈ Ji},
B′ ≡ ∪B′i,
B∗i ≡ {Ψ′(B)|B ∈ B′i}, and
B∗ ≡ ∪B∗i .
It is straightforward to verify that B∗,B∗1,B∗2,B∗3 are as desired, using a simpler argument
than that of the previous case. Since A was an arbitrary atom, we are done. 
Purely-catalogued: Trivial.
◦ Step 6: Conclude.
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By Step 4 and the Supercabinet Construction Lemma, (S∗,A∗,%∗) has a supercabinet
{Z∗v}. For each v ∈ 2, let Z∗v ∈ Z∗v , and define Zv to be the equivalence class of events in
A for ∪i∈Z∗vAi. It is straightforward to verify {Zv} is a supercabinet for (S,A,%), so by
the Supercabinet Blueprint Lemma we are done. 
Appendix 7
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3.
• Theorem 3: If (S,A,%) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying mono-
tone continuity and unlikely cores, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Proof: For each pair A,B ∈ A◦, define A %◦ B if and only if A % B. Similarly, for
each pair A,B ∈ A⊕, define A %⊕ B if and only if A % B.
◦ Step 1: Define µ◦ ∈Mσ(A◦), µ⊕ : A⊕ → [0, 1], and µ : A → [0, 1].
Since S◦  S⊕, by monotonicity S◦  ∅. It is immediate that (S◦,A◦,%◦) is an atom-
less qualitative probability space satisfying monotone continuity; thus by Theorem V2,
it has unique representation µ◦ ∈ Mσ(A◦), and moreover µ◦ is infinitely-divisible. If
S⊕ = ∅, we are done, so assume S⊕ 6= ∅.
To define µ⊕ : A⊕ → [0, 1], let A⊕ ∈ A⊕. By monotonicity, S◦ % S⊕ % A⊕; thus by
the Carving Lemma, there is A◦ ∈ A◦ such that A⊕ ∼ A◦. Define µ⊕(A⊕) ≡ µ◦(A◦).
Define the constant for normalization κ ≡ µ⊕(S⊕) + µ◦(S◦); then κ > 0. For each
A ∈ A, define
µ(A) ≡ µ
⊕(A ∩ S⊕) + µ◦(A ∩ S◦)
κ
. 
◦ Step 2: For each disjoint pair A⊕, B⊕ ∈ A⊕, there are disjoint A◦, B◦ ∈ A◦ such that
A⊕ ∼ A◦ and B⊕ ∼ B◦.
Let A⊕, B⊕ ∈ A⊕ be disjoint. By monotonicity, S◦ % S⊕ % A⊕; thus by the Carv-
ing Lemma, there is A◦ ∈ A◦ such that A⊕ ∼ A◦. By separability, A⊕ ∪B⊕ ∼ A◦ ∪B⊕.
Define C◦ ≡ S◦\A◦. By monotonicity and the above observation,
A◦ ∪ C◦ = S◦
% S⊕
% A⊕ ∪B⊕
∼ A◦ ∪B⊕,
so by separability, C◦ % B⊕. Thus by the Carving Lemma, there is B◦ ⊆ C◦ such that
B◦ ∈ A◦ and B⊕ ∼ B◦. By construction, A◦ and B◦ are disjoint, as desired. 
◦ Step 3: µ is additive.
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Let A,B ∈ A be disjoint. We wish to show µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) + µ(B). Define
A⊕ ≡ A ∩ S⊕, A◦ ≡ A ∩ S◦, B⊕ ≡ B ∩ S⊕, and B◦ ≡ B ∩ S◦. By definition,
µ(A ∪B) = µ
⊕(A⊕ ∪B⊕) + µ◦(A◦ ∪B◦)
κ
,
µ(A) =
µ⊕(A⊕) + µ◦(A◦)
κ
, and
µ(B) =
µ⊕(B⊕) + µ◦(B◦)
κ
.
Since µ◦ ∈Mσ(A◦), thus µ◦(A◦ ∪B◦) = µ◦(A◦) + µ◦(B◦), so it suffices to show µ⊕(A⊕ ∪
B⊕) = µ⊕(A⊕) + µ⊕(B⊕).
Since A⊕ and B⊕ are disjoint, by Step 2, there are disjoint A′, B′ ∈ A◦ such that
A⊕ ∼ A′ and B⊕ ∼ B′. By the Domination Lemma twice, A⊕ ∪ B⊕ ∼ A′ ∪ B′. Thus by
construction of µ⊕,
µ⊕(A⊕ ∪B⊕) = µ◦(A′ ∪B′),
µ⊕(A⊕) = µ◦(A′), and
µ⊕(B⊕) = µ◦(B′).
Since µ◦ ∈Mσ(A◦), thus µ◦(A′∪B′) = µ◦(A′)+µ◦(B′), so µ⊕(A⊕∪B⊕) = µ(A⊕)+µ(B⊕),
as desired. 
◦ Step 4: Conclude.
Let A,B ∈ A. We wish to show A % B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B). The idea of the
proof is to construct, by algorithm, a list of pairs (A,B) = (A1, B1), (A2, B2), (A3, B3), ...
such that for each i,
(i) Ai % Bi if and only if Ai+1 % Bi+1, and
(ii) µ(Ai) ≥ µ(Bi) if and only if µ(Ai+1) ≥ µ(Bi+1).
Moreover, the process is guaranteed to terminate with some pair (AΩ, BΩ) for which the
statement “AΩ % BΩ if and only if µ(AΩ) ≥ µ(BΩ)” can be established, immediately
proving “A % B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B),” as desired. Visually, it can be helpful
to think of this list of pairs as a “logical ladder,” where the rails and rungs are formed
of if-and-only-if arrows. For convenience, given Ai, Bi, Ai+1, Bi+1, let us say “we can
continue with Ai+1 and Bi+1” as shorthand for statements (i) and (ii) above.
Given Ai, Bi ∈ A, define the following four events:
A◦i ≡ Ai ∩ S◦,
A⊕i ≡ Ai ∩ S⊕,
B◦i ≡ Bi ∩ S◦, and
B⊕i ≡ Bi ∩ S⊕.
Moreover, define n◦i , n
⊕
i ∈ {0, 1, 2} by:
n◦i ≡ |{C ∈ {A◦i , B◦i }|C 6= ∅}|, and
n⊕i ≡ |{C ∈ {A⊕i , B⊕i }|C 6= ∅}|.
Given Ai, Bi, the procedure is defined by following the earliest instruction that applies:
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1. If Ai = ∅ or Bi = ∅, then terminate.
In the former case, ∅ % Bi implies (by monotonicity and the Domination Lemma)
∅ % B⊕i and ∅ % B◦i ; thus 0 = µ⊕(∅) ≥ µ⊕(B⊕i ) and 0 = µ◦(∅) ≥ µ◦(B◦i ), so by
construction 0 = µ(∅) = µ(Bi). Conversely, µ(∅) ≥ µ(Bi) implies 0 ≥ µ⊕(B⊕i ) and
0 ≥ µ◦(B◦i ); thus ∅ % B⊕i and ∅ % B◦i , so by the Domination Lemma ∅ % Bi.
In the latter case, we have directly that Ai % ∅ and µ(Ai) ≥ µ(∅).
2. If n◦i = 0 or n
⊕
i = 0, then terminate; by construction of µ, Ai % Bi if and only if
µ(Ai) ≥ µ(Bi).
3. If n◦i = 2, then there are two cases.
• If A◦i % B◦i , then by the Carving Lemma, there is C◦ ⊆ A◦i such that C◦ ∼ B◦i .
Define B′i ≡ (Bi\B◦i )∪C◦. By separability and additivity of µ, we can continue with
Ai and B
′
i. Define Ai+1 ≡ Ai\C◦ and Bi+1 ≡ B′i\C◦. By separability and additivity
of µ, we can continue with Ai+1 and Bi+1.
• If B◦i % A◦i , perform the operation analogous to that in the previous case.
In both cases, n◦i+1 < n
◦
i and n
⊕
i+1 = n
⊕
i .
4. If n◦i = 1 and n
⊕
i = 2, then there are two cases.
• If A◦i = ∅ and A⊕i 6= ∅, then since by monotonicity S◦ % S⊕ % A⊕i , by the
Carving Lemma there is A◦ ∈ A◦ such that A◦ ∼ A⊕i . Define Ai+1 ≡ A◦ and define
Bi+1 ≡ Bi. By construction of µ, we can continue with Ai+1 and Bi+1.
• If B◦i = ∅ and B⊕i 6= ∅, perform the operation analogous to that in the
previous case.
In both cases, n◦i = 2 and n
⊕
i+1 = 1.
5. If n◦i = 1 and n
⊕
i = 1, and neither Ai nor Bi is ∅, then there are two cases:
• If A◦i = ∅ and A⊕i 6= ∅, perform the operation analogous to that in the first
case of the previous instruction.
• If B◦i = ∅ and B⊕i 6= ∅, perform the operation analogous to that in the second
case of the previous instruction.
In both cases, n◦i = 2 and n
⊕
i+1 = 0.
It is straightforward to verify that the process must terminate. By Theorem V1, since
µ ∈ M(A) represents %, thus µ ∈ Mσ(A). It is clear from its construction that µ is the
unique such measure. 
Appendix 8
In this appendix, we prove the Finite-Twin Lemma and Theorem 4.
• Finite-Twin Lemma: If (S,A,%) is a σ-catalogued qualitative probability space
satisfying (monotone) continuity and 1+-AS, then for each s ∈ S⊕ such that S◦ % {s +
1, s+ 2, ...}, there is Ts ∈ A such that
(i) Ts ⊆ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...} ∪ S◦,
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(ii) Ts ∩ S⊕ is finite, and
(iii) Ts ∼ {s}.
Proof: Let (S,A,%) and s ∈ S⊕ satisfy the hypotheses. By 1+-AS, there is pairwise-
disjoint B ⊆ (↓ {s}) such that (∪B)  {s}. For each B ∈ B and each s′ ∈ B∩S⊕, s′ > s;
else since B ∈ (↓ {s}), by monotonicity {s}  B % {s′} % {s}, contradicting {s} ∼ {s}.
Thus (∪B) ⊆ {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...} ∪ S◦.
We claim there is A ⊆ (∪B) such that A∩ S⊕ is finite and A  {s}. Indeed, for each
i ∈ N, define Ai ≡ (∪B) ∩ {1, 2, ..., i}. We cannot have that for each i ∈ N, {s}  Ai,
else by continuity, {s} % limAi = (∪B), contradicting (∪B)  Ai. Thus we can define i∗
as the least i such that Ai % {s}, and we can define A ≡ Ai∗ . If A ∼ {s}, then define
Ts ≡ A and we are done, so assume A  {s}.
If A∩ S⊕  {s}, then by monotonicity, S◦ % {s+ 1, s+ 2, ...} % A∩ S⊕ % {s}, so by
the Carving Lemma there is Ts ⊆ S◦ such that Ts ∼ {s} and we are done. If {s} % A∩S⊕,
then we follow an argument analogous to that in the proof of the Carving Lemma. We
begin by defining V +, V − ⊆ [0, 1] by:
V + ≡ {v ∈ [0, 1]|
V + ≡ {v ∈ [0, µ◦(A ∩ S◦)]|C ∈ A◦ and µ◦(C) = v implies (A ∩ S⊕) ∪ C % {s}}, and
V − ≡ {v ∈ [0, µ◦(A ∩ S◦)]|C ∈ A◦ and µ◦(C) = v implies {s} % (A ∩ S⊕) ∪ C}.
Through the analogous argument, there is C ∈ A◦ such that (A ∩ S⊕) ∪C ∼ {s}; define
Ts ≡ (A ∩ S⊕) ∪ C and we are done. 
• Theorem 4: If (S,A,%) is a σ-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
(monotone) continuity and 3+-AS, then it has a unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A).
Proof: Let (S,A,%) be a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying monotone
continuity and 3+-AS. If (S,A,%) is purely-catalogued, then we are done by Theorem 1,
and if S◦ ∼ ∅ the proof with Theorem 1 is trivial, so assume S◦  ∅.
◦ Step 1: Define %◦ and µ◦.
For each pair A,B ∈ A◦, define A %◦ B if and only if A % B. Since S◦  ∅, thus
(S◦,A◦,%◦) is an atomless qualitative probability space satisfying monotone continuity,
so by Theorem V2, there is a unique µ◦ ∈ Mσ(A◦) representing %◦. Moreover, µ◦ is
infinitely-divisible. 
◦ Step 2: For each ‘middle’ m ∈ S⊕, define the space (S←m,A←m,%←m), its associated
S←m⊕ and A←m⊕, the space (Sm→,Am→,%m→), and its associated Sm→⊕ and Am→⊕.
Let m ∈ S⊕.
Define S←m ≡ {1, 2, ...,m} ∪ S◦ and define A←m ≡ A ∩ 2S←m . For each pair A,B ∈
A←m, define A %←m B if and only if A % B. Define S←m⊕ ≡ {1, 2, ...,m} and define
A←m⊕ ≡ 2S←m⊕ .
Define Sm→ ≡ {m,m + 1, ...} ∪ S◦ and define Am→ ≡ A ∩ 2Sm→ . For each pair
A,B ∈ Am→, define A %m→ B if and only if A % B. Define Sm→⊕ ≡ {m,m+ 1, ...} and
define Am→⊕ ≡ 2Sm→⊕ .
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◦ Step 3: Identify m←∗ ∈ S⊕ such that for each m ≥ m←∗, (S←m,A←m,%←m) is a
finitely-catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying monotone continuity and 3-
AS.
It is straightforward to verify that for each m ∈ S⊕, (S←m,A←m,%←m) is a finitely-
catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying monotone continuity.
We wish to identify m←∗ and verify that it is as desired. To begin, for each s ∈ S⊕,
let us say that t ≥ s is a truncation point of s if there are
(i) pairwise-disjoint B ⊆ (↓ {s}) ⊆ A←t, and
(ii) B1,B2,B3 ⊆ B partitioning B,
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (∪Bi) %←t {s}. Informally, if t is a truncation point of s,
then {s} is third-order swarmed by less-likely non-null events even if we ‘truncate’ at t
by removing the tail of cores with higher index.
First, for each s ∈ S⊕, we construct a particular truncation point τ(s). Indeed, let
s ∈ S⊕. Since % satisfies 3+-AS, there are
(i) pairwise-disjoint B ⊆ (↓ {s}), and
(ii) B1,B2,B3 ⊆ B′ partitioning B,
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (∪Bi)  {s}. Let i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For each j ∈ N,
define Bj ≡ (∪Bi) ∩ S←j. Then limBj = (∪Bi), and by separability, (Bj) is increasing in
likelihood. We cannot have that for each j ∈ N, {s}  Bj, else by continuity, {s} % (∪Bi),
contradicting (∪Bi)  {s}. Thus we can define j∗(i) as the least j such that Bj % {s}.
Define
τ(s) ≡ max{s, j∗(1), j∗(2), j∗(3)},
define B ≡ B ∩ A←τ(s), and for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define Bi ≡ Bi ∩ A←τ(s). It is straight-
forward to verify that these collections of events are as desired, so that τ(s) ≥ s is indeed
a truncation point of s.
Second, we claim there is s∗ ∈ S⊕ such that for each s ≥ s∗, s is one of its own
truncation points. Indeed, since µ◦ is infinitely-divisible and represents %◦, there are
A◦1, A
◦
2, A
◦
3 partitioning S
◦ such that A◦1 ∼ A◦2 ∼ A◦3. Since S◦  ∅, thus by separability,
A◦1  ∅. It cannot be that for each s ∈ S⊕, {s}  A◦1; else by continuity, ∅ = lim{s} % A◦1,
contradicting A◦1  ∅. Thus we can define s∗ to be the least s ∈ S⊕ such that A◦1 % {s}.
To see s∗ is as desired, let s ≥ s∗. Then A◦1 % {s∗} % {s}, so by the Carving Lemma,
there is A◦s ⊆ A◦1 such that A◦s ∼ {s}  ∅. Then µ◦(A◦s) > 0. Since µ◦ is infinitely-
divisible, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there is Bi be partitioning A◦i such that for each B ∈ Bi,
µ◦(A◦s) > µ
◦(B) > 0. Define B = ∪Bi. It is straightforward to verify that these collections
of events are as desired, so that s is indeed a truncation point of s.
Finally, define m←∗ ≡ max{τ(1), τ(2), ..., τ(s∗−1), s∗}. To see that m←∗ is as desired,
let m ≥ m←∗. Then the cores in (S←m,A←m,%←m) are {1, 2, ...,m}. By construc-
tion, for each s ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, there is a truncation point of s in {1, 2, ...,m}. Thus
(S←m,A←m,%←m) satisfies 3-AS, as desired. 
◦ Step 4: Identify m∗→ ∈ S⊕ such that for each m ≥ m∗→, (Sm→,Am→,%m→) is a
catalogued probability space satisfying monotone continuity and unlikely cores.
It is straightforward to verify that for each m ∈ S⊕, (Sm→,Am→,%m→) is a catalogued
qualitative probability space satisfying monotone continuity.
56
We wish to identify m∗→ and verify that it is as desired. It cannot be that for each
s ∈ S⊕, {s, s+1, ...}  S◦; else by continuity, ∅ = lims→∞{s, s+1, ...} % S◦, contradicting
S◦  ∅. Let m∗→ be the least s ∈ S⊕ such that S◦ % {s, s + 1, ...}. To see that m∗→
is as desired, let m ≥ m∗→. Then the cores in (Sm→,Am→,%m→) are {m,m + 1, ...}.
By monotonicity, S◦ % {m∗→,m∗→ + 1, ...} % {m,m + 1, ...}; thus (Sm→,Am→,%m→)
satisfies unlikely cores, as desired. 
◦ Step 5: Define m∗ such that for each m ≥ m∗, there is a unique µm ∈ Mσ(A) such
that
(i) for each pair A,B ∈ A←m, A % B if and only if µm(A) ≥ µm(B), and
(ii) for each pair A,B ∈ Am+1→, A % B if and only if µm(A) ≥ µm(B).
Define m∗ ≡ max{m←∗,m∗→}. Let m ≥ m∗. To define µm ∈ Mσ(A), we first define
µ←m ∈Mσ(A←m) and µm+1→ ∈Mσ(Am+1→).
Since m ≥ m∗ ≥ m←∗, by Step 3, (S←m,A←m,%←m) is a finitely-catalogued quali-
tative probability space satisfying monotone continuity and 3-AS. Thus by Theorem 2,
there is a unique µ←m ∈Mσ(A←m) representing %←m.
Since m ≥ m∗ ≥ m∗→, (Sm+1→,Am+1→,%m+1→) is a finitely-catalogued qualitative
probability space satisfying monotone continuity and unlikely cores. Thus by Theorem 3,
there is a unique µm+1→ ∈Mσ(Am+1→) representing %m+1→.
Assume we have µm ∈ Mσ(A) satisfying the requirements. Then for each A ∈ A←m,
we can define µ←(A) by:
µ←(A) ≡ µ
m(A)
µm(S←m)
.
It is straightforward to verify that µ← ∈Mσ(A←m) and µ← represents (S←m,A←m,A←m);
thus by the uniqueness of µ←m, µm(A) = µ←m(A)µm(S←m). Since µm is additive,
µm(A) = µ←m(A)[µm(S◦) + µm(S←m⊕)].
Similarly, for each A ∈ Am+1→, µm(A) = µm+1→(A)[µm(S◦) + µm(Sm+1→⊕)].
Altogether, for each A ∈ (A←m ∪Am+1→), µm(A) can be written in terms of µm(S◦),
µm(S←m⊕), and µm(Sm+1→⊕). For clarity, let us define the ‘unknown’ x1, x2, x3 > 0 and
the ‘known’ a, b, c, d > 0 by:
x1 ≡ µm(S◦),
x2 ≡ µm(S←m⊕),
x3 ≡ µm(Sm+1→⊕),
a ≡ µ←m(S◦),
b ≡ µm+1→(S◦),
c ≡ µ←m(S←m⊕), and
d ≡ µm+1→(Sm+1→⊕).
Then we have the following system of equations:
x1 = a(x1 + x2),
x1 = b(x1 + x3),
x2 = c(x1 + x2),
x3 = d(x1 + x3), and
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.
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As each variable is positive, it is straightforward that this system has a unique solution.
To define µ, first define µm(S◦), µm(S←m⊕), and µm(Sm+1→⊕) using the solution to
the above system. Then, for each A ∈ (A←m ∪ Am+1→), define µm(A) using µm(S◦),
µm(S←m⊕), and µm(Sm+1→⊕) as specified above. Finally, for each A ∈ A, define
µm(A) ≡ µm(A ∩ S◦) + µm(A ∩ S←m⊕) + µm(A ∩ Sm+1→⊕).
By construction, µm(S) = 1. Moreover, the restriction of µm to A←m is a positive
multiple of µ←m, and the restriction of µm to A→m is a positive multiple of µm+1→. Since
µ←m is σ-additive on A←m and µm+1→ is σ-additive on Am+1→, thus by construction,
µm is σ-additive across A. Since µ←m represents %←m and µm+1→ represents %m+1→,
altogether µm is as desired. It is clear from its construction that µm is the unique such
measure. 
◦ Step 6: For each pair m,m′ ≥ m∗, µm = µm′ ; define µ to be this measure.
We prove that for each m ≥ m∗, µm = µm+1. Let m ≥ m∗. By Step 5, to show
µm = µm+1, it suffices to show
(i) for each pair A,B ∈ A←m, A % B if and only if µm+1(A) ≥ µm+1(B), and
(ii) for each pair A,B ∈ Am+1→, A % B if and only if µm+1(A) ≥ µm+1(B),
since µm is the unique measure satisfying (i) and (ii). Moreover, (i) is immediate from
the construction of µm+1, as A←m ⊆ A←m+1. Thus it remains to show (ii).
By Step 4 and Step 5, S◦ % {m+1}. Thus by the Carving Lemma, there is A◦m+1 ∈ A◦
such thatA◦m+1 ∼ {m+1}. SinceA◦m+1, {m+1} ∈ Am+1→, thus µm(A◦m+1) = µm({m+1}).
Since A◦m+1, {m+ 1} ∈ A←m+1, thus µm+1(A◦m+1) = µm+1({m+ 1}).
For each A ∈ Am+1→, define v′(A), v′′(A) by:
v′(A) ≡ µ
m(A)
µm(Sm+2→)
, and
v′′(A) ≡ µ
m+1(A)
µm+1(Sm+2→)
.
Let µ′ be the restriction of v′ to Am+2→, and similarly let µ′′ be the restriction of v′′ to
Am+2→. Clearly, both µ′ and µ′′ are σ-measures representing (Sm+2→,Am+2→,%m+2→),
so by the uniqueness of µm+2→, µ′ = µ′′. Thus for each A ∈ Am+2→, v′(A) = v′′(A).
Since µm(A◦m+1) = µ
m({m+ 1}) and µm+1(A◦m+1) = µm+1({m+ 1}), thus v′(A◦m+1) =
v′({m+ 1}) and v′′(A◦m+1) = v′′({m+ 1}), so
v′({m+ 1}) = v′(A◦m+1)
= v′′(A◦m+1)
= v′′({m+ 1}).
Since v′ and v′′ are additive, thus v′ = v′′. Since the restriction of µm to Am+1→ represents
(Sm+1→,Am+1→,%m+1→), and since v′ is the product of this restriction with a positive
number, altogether v′ = v′′ represents (Sm+1→,Am+1→,%m+1→). Since the restriction of
µm+1 to Am+1→ is the product of v′′ with a positive number, altogether we are done. 
◦ Step 7: Define S← and S→ such that S◦ % S→, then show that for the partition
S ≡ {S◦, S←, S→}, for each pair S∗, S∗∗ ∈ S and each pair A,B ⊆ (S∗ ∪ S∗∗), A % B if
and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B).
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Define S← ≡ S←m∗⊕, define S→ ≡ Sm∗+1→⊕, and define S ≡ {S◦, S←, S→}. By Step 4
and Step 5, S◦ % S→. Clearly, S is a partition. Let S∗, S∗∗ ∈ S and let A,B ∈ A with
A,B ⊆ (S∗ ∪ S∗∗).
Case 1: S∗, S∗∗ ∈ {S◦, S←}. Then we are done by Step 5 and Step 6.
Case 2: S∗, S∗∗ ∈ {S◦, S→}. Then we are done by Step 5 and Step 6.
Case 3: {S∗, S∗∗} = {S←, S→}. Let C ∈ A with C ⊆ S←∪S→, define C← ≡ C∩S←,
and define C→ ≡ C ∩ S→. By monotonicity, S◦ % S→ % C→, so by the Carving Lemma,
there is C◦ ∈ A◦ such that C◦ ∼ C→. By Case 2, µ(C◦) = µ(C→). Define C ′ ≡ C←∪C◦.
By separability, C ′ ∼ C, and by additivity of µ, µ(C ′) = µ(C). Since C was arbitrary, thus
there are A′, B′ ∈ A with A′, B′ ⊆ (S← ∪ S◦) such that A ∼ A′, B ∼ B′, µ(A) = µ(A′),
and µ(B) = µ(B′). By Case 1, A′ % B′ if and only if µ(A′) ≥ µ(B′); thus A % B if and
only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B), as desired. 
◦ Step 8: Conclude.
A simpler version of the argument in this step is found in Step 4 of the proof of
Theorem 3.
Let A,B ∈ A. We wish to show A % B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B). The idea of the
proof is to construct, by algorithm, a list of pairs (A,B) = (A1, B1), (A2, B2), (A3, B3), ...
such that for each i,
(i) Ai % Bi if and only if Ai+1 % Bi+1, and
(ii) µ(Ai) ≥ µ(Bi) if and only if µ(Ai+1) ≥ µ(Bi+1).
Moreover, the process is guaranteed to terminate with some pair (AΩ, BΩ) for which the
statement “AΩ % BΩ if and only if µ(AΩ) ≥ µ(BΩ)” can be established, immediately
proving “A % B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B),” as desired. Visually, it can be helpful
to think of this list of pairs as a “logical ladder,” where the rails and rungs are formed
of if-and-only-if arrows. For convenience, given Ai, Bi, Ai+1, Bi+1, let us say “we can
continue with Ai+1 and Bi+1” as shorthand for statements (i) and (ii) above.
Given Ai, Bi ∈ A, define the following six events:
A◦i ≡ Ai ∩ S◦,
A←i ≡ Ai ∩ S←,
A→i ≡ Ai ∩ S→,
B◦i ≡ Bi ∩ S◦,
B←i ≡ Bi ∩ S←, and
B→i ≡ Bi ∩ S→.
Moreover, define n◦i , n
←
i , n
→
i ∈ {0, 1, 2} by:
n◦i ≡ |{C ∈ {A◦i , B◦i }|C 6= ∅}|,
n←i ≡ |{C ∈ {A←i , B←i }|C 6= ∅}|, and
n→i ≡ |{C ∈ {A→i , B→i }|C 6= ∅}|.
Given Ai, Bi, the procedure is defined by following the earliest instruction that applies:
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1. If Ai = ∅ or Bi = ∅, then terminate.
In the former case, ∅ % Bi implies (by monotonicity and the Domination Lemma)
∅ % B←i , ∅ % B→i , and ∅ % B◦i ; thus by Step 5 and Step 6, 0 = µ(∅) ≥ µ(B←i ),
0 = µ(∅) ≥ µ(B→i ), and 0 = µ(∅) ≥ µ(B◦i ); so by additivity 0 = µ(∅) = µ(Bi).
Conversely, µ(∅) ≥ µ(Bi) implies 0 ≥ µ(B←i ), 0 ≥ µ(B→i ), and 0 ≥ µ(B◦i ); thus by
Step 5 and Step 6, ∅ % B←i , ∅ % B→i , and ∅ % B◦i ; so by the Domination Lemma
∅ % Bi.
In the latter case, we have directly that Ai % ∅ and µ(Ai) ≥ µ(∅).
2. If n◦i = 0, or n
←
i = 0, or n
→
i = 0, then terminate; by Step 7, Ai % Bi if and only if
µ(Ai) ≥ µ(Bi).
3. If n◦i = 2, then there are two cases.
• If A◦i % B◦i , then by the Carving Lemma, there is C◦ ⊆ A◦i such that C◦ ∼ B◦i .
Define B′i ≡ (Bi\B◦i )∪C◦. By separability and additivity of µ, we can continue with
Ai and B
′
i. Define Ai+1 ≡ Ai\C◦ and Bi+1 ≡ B′i\C◦. By separability and additivity
of µ, we can continue with Ai+1 and Bi+1.
• If B◦i % A◦i , perform the operation analogous to that in the previous case.
In both cases, n◦i+1 < n
◦
i and n
→
i+1 = n
→
i .
4. If n◦i = 1 and n
→
i = 2, then there are two cases.
• If A◦i = ∅ and A→i 6= ∅, then since by monotonicity S◦ % S→ % A→i , by the
Carving Lemma there is A◦ ∈ A◦ such that A◦ ∼ A→i . Define Ai+1 ≡ (Ai\A→i )∪A◦
and define Bi+1 ≡ Bi. By separability and additivity of µ, we can continue with
Ai+1 and Bi+1.
• If B◦i = ∅ and B→i 6= ∅, perform the operation analogous to that in the
previous case.
In both cases, n→i+1 = 1.
5. If n◦i = 1, n
→
i = 1, and neither A nor B is contained in S
←, then there are two
cases:
• If A◦i = ∅ and A→i 6= ∅, perform the operation analogous to that in the first
case of the previous instruction.
• If B◦i = ∅ and B→i 6= ∅, perform the operation analogous to that in the second
case of the previous instruction.
In both cases, n→i+1 = 0.
6. If n◦i = 1, n
→
i = 1, either A or B is contained in S
←, and neither Ai nor Bi is ∅,
then there are two cases:
• If Ai = A←i , then define s ≡ maxAi. By the Finite-Twin Lemma, there is
finite Ts ⊆ {s+1, s+2, ...}∪S◦ such that Ts ∼ {s}. Define m∗∗ ≡ max{maxTs,m∗}.
Since Ts, {s} ∈ A←m∗∗ , thus by Step 5 and Step 6, µ(Ts) = µ({s}). Define Ai+1 ≡
(Ai\{s}) ∪ Ts and define Bi+1 ≡ Bi. By separability and additivity of µ, we can
continue with Ai+1 and Bi+1.
• If Bi = B←i , perform the operation analogous to that in the previous case.
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It is straightforward to verify that the process cannot indefinitely loop through the
first four instructions. If the fifth instruction is ever reached, then the process terminates
on the next step.
For each pair A,B ⊆ S←, let the statement A is lexicographically greater than B,
written A >LEX B, be defined by:
A >LEX B if and only if minA\B < minB\A.
Observe that each of the first five instructions sets A←i+1 ≡ A←i and B←i+1 ≡ B←i . Moreover,
each time the sixth instruction is reached, either A←i+1 <LEX A
←
i or B
←
i+1 <LEX B
←
i .
Because A← is finite, there is some k for which A←k = ∅ and there is some k′ for which
B←k′ = ∅. Define Ω = max{k, k′}, and the process terminates with AΩ, BΩ at the latest.
Altogether, µ ∈ Mσ(A) represents (S,A,%). By Step 5 and Step 6, µ is the unique
such measure. 
Appendix 9
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 5.
• Theorem 5: A triple (S,A,%) is a qualitative probability space satisfying (monotone)
continuity and 3+-AS if and only if it has a unique representation µ ∈ Mσ(A) such that
for each A ∈ A,
(i) if A is an atom, µ(∪(↓ A)) > 3µ(A) > 0, and
(ii) if A contains no atoms, for each λ ∈ [0, 1], there is B ⊆ A such that µ(B) = λµ(A).
Proof: It is trivial that our axioms are necessary for such a representation, so let
(S,A,%) be a qualitative probability space satisfying (monotone) continuity and 3+-AS.
◦ Step 1: There is no increasing sequence of atoms.
Assume, by way of contradiction, there is (Ai) ∈ (Aα)N such that A1 ≺ A2 ≺ .... Then
for each pair i, j ∈ N with i > j, by monotonicity, Ai  Aj % Ai ∩ Aj, so since Ai is an
atom, thus Ai ∩ Aj ∼ ∅. For each i ∈ N, define Bi ≡ Ai\(
⋃
j<iAj) = Ai\(
⋃
j<iAj ∩ Ai);
by monotonicity and separability, (
⋃
j<iAi ∩ Aj) ∼ ∅, so by separability Bi ∼ Ai. By
construction, the Bi are pairwise-disjoint. But then for each i ∈ N, Bi ∼ Ai % A1, so by
continuity, ∅ = limBi % A1, contradicting that A1 is an atom. 
◦ Step 2: Construct index set I and pairwise-disjoint atoms (Ai)i∈I , indexed in non-
increasing order of likelihood, such that S◦ ≡ S\(∪Ai) contains no atoms.
If there are no atoms, define I ≡ ∅ and we are done; otherwise, we proceed inductively.
For the base step, by Step 1, there is a %-maximum A1 in Aα, and for each B ∈ Aα
such that B ⊆ S\A1, A1 % B. For the inductive step, assume that k ∈ N and we have
pairwise-disjoint atoms A1, A2, ..., Ak such that
(1) A1 % A2 % ... % Ak, and
(2) for each B ∈ Aα such that B ⊆ S\⋃ki=1 Ai, Ak % B.
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Define Aαk ⊆ Aα by:
Aαk ≡ {B ∈ Aα|B ⊆ S\
k⋃
i=1
Ai}.
If Aαk is empty, then we are done. If Aαk is nonempty, then by Step 1 it has %-maximum
Ak+1. Since Ak+1 ∈ Aα and Ak+1 ⊆ S\
⋃k
i=1 Ai, thus by the inductive hypothesis,
A1, A2, ..., Ak+1 are pairwise-disjoint atoms and A1 % A2 % ... % Ak+1. By construction,
for each B ∈ Aα such that B ⊆ S\⋃k+1i=1 Ai, Ak+1 % B.
Define S◦ ≡ S\(∪Ai). If construction terminates at some step, then I = {1, 2, ..., |I|};
otherwise I = N. If I is empty or finite, then S◦ contains no atoms by construction. If
I = N, then assume, by way of contradiction, there is an atom A ⊆ S◦. By construction,
for each i ∈ N, Ai % A. But then by continuity, ∅ = limAi % A, contradicting that A is
an atom. 
◦ Step 3: Construct (S∗,A∗,%∗) and the mappings Ψ,Ψ′,Ψ∗.
Informally, to construct the catalogued space, we replace each Ai with {i}. Formally,
define S∗ ≡ S◦ ∪ I. Let A∗ be the σ-algebra generated by (2S◦ ∩A)∪ 2I ; that is, A ∈ A∗
if and only if there are B1 ⊆ S◦ and B2 ⊆ I such that (i) B1 ∈ A, and (ii) A = B1 ∪B2.
Let A′ ⊆ A be the collection of events that contain any intersected Ai:
A′ ≡ {A ∈ A| for each i ∈ I, A ∩ Ai ∈ {∅, Ai}}
Define Ψ : A → A′, Ψ′ : A′ → A∗, and Ψ∗ : A∗ → A′ by:
Ψ(A) ≡ (A ∩ S◦) ∪ (⋃{Ai ∈ A|A ∩ Ai ∼ Ai}).
Ψ′(A) ≡ (A ∩ S◦) ∪ {i ∈ I|A ∩ Ai = Ai}
Ψ∗(A) ≡ Ψ′−1(A).
Define %∗ by: for each pair A,B ∈ A∗, A %∗ B if and only if Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(B). 
◦ Step 4: Ψ preserves likelihood.
We wish to prove that for each A ∈ A, A ∼ Ψ(A). Indeed, define B0 ≡ A ∩ S◦ and
C0 ≡ Ψ(A) ∩ S◦, and define (Bi), (Ci) ∈ AI recursively by:
Bi+1 ≡ Bi ∪ (A ∩ Ai+1)
Ci+1 ≡ Ci ∪ (Ψ(A) ∩ Ai+1).
We claim that for each i ∈ I, Bi ∼ Ci, which we prove by induction. For the base
step, B0 = C0. For the inductive step, assume that Bi ∼ Ci. By definition of Ψ,
(A ∩ Ai+1) ∼ (Ψ(A) ∩ Ai+1). By construction, Bi and (A ∩ Ai+1) are disjoint, so by the
Domination Lemma, Bi+1 % Ci+1. By construction, Ci and (Ψ(A) ∩ Ai+1) are disjoint,
so by the Domination Lemma, Ci+1 % Bi+1. Thus Bi+1 ∼ Ci+1 as desired.
If I is finite, then A = B|I| and Ψ(A) = C|I|, so A ∼ Ψ(A) as desired. Otherwise,
A = limBi and C = limCi, so by the Limit-Order Lemma twice, A ∼ Ψ(A) as desired.
◦ Step 5: Ψ, Ψ′, and Ψ∗ each preserve disjoint pairs.
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We wish to prove that for each of these mappings, the images of any disjoint pair in
the domain form a disjoint pair in the co-domain. The trivial proofs for Ψ′ and Ψ∗ are
omitted.
Let B,C ∈ A be disjoint. Since (B ∩S◦) = (Ψ(B)∩S◦) and (C ∩S◦) = (Ψ(C)∩S◦),
thus (Ψ(B) ∩ S◦) and (Ψ(C) ∩ S◦) are disjoint.
We claim for each i ∈ I, (Ψ(B) ∩Ai) and (Ψ(C) ∩Ai) are disjoint. Indeed, let i ∈ I.
Assume, by way of contradiction, (B ∩ Ai) and (C ∩ Ai) are both non-null. Then since
Ai is an atom, (B ∩ Ai) ∼ Ai and (C ∩ Ai) ∼ Ai  ∅. But then since (B ∩ Ai) and
(C ∩Ai) are disjoint, thus by the Domination Lemma (B ∩Ai)∪ (C ∩Ai)  Ai ∪∅ = Ai,
contradicting monotonicity. Thus either (B ∩Ai) or (C ∩Ai) is null, so either Ψ(B ∩Ai)
or Ψ(C ∩ Ai) is empty, so Ψ(B ∩ Ai) and Ψ(C ∩ Ai) are disjoint, as desired.
Since S = S◦ ∪ (∪Ai), and since Ψ(B) and Ψ(C) do not intersect in S◦ or in any Ai,
thus Ψ(B) and Ψ(C) are disjoint, as desired.
◦ Step 6: Verify (S∗,A∗,%∗) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying
monotone continuity and 3+-AS.
We verify each property in sequence:
Order: To see that %∗ is complete, let A,B ∈ A∗. Since % is complete, Ψ∗(A) %
Ψ∗(B); thus A %∗ B as desired.
To see that %∗ is transitive, let A,B,C ∈ A∗ such that A %∗ B and B %∗ C. Then
Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(B) and Ψ∗(B) % Ψ∗(C), so by transitivity of %, Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(C); thus
A %∗ C as desired.
Separability: Let A,B,C ∈ A∗ such that A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅. Since Ψ∗ preserves
disjoint pairs, Ψ∗(A)∩Ψ∗(C) = Ψ∗(B)∩Ψ∗(C) = ∅. Since % is separable, Ψ∗(A) % Ψ∗(B)
if and only if Ψ∗(A)∪Ψ∗(C) % Ψ∗(B)∪Ψ∗(C); thus A %∗ B if and only if A∪C %∗ B∪C,
as desired.
Monotonicity: Let A,B ∈ A with A ⊆ B. Then Ψ∗(A) ⊆ Ψ∗(B). Since % is
monotonic, Ψ∗(B) % Ψ∗(A); thus B %∗ A, as desired.
Nondegeneracy: Since % is nondegenerate, there are A,B ∈ A such that A  B.
Since Ψ preserves likelihood, Ψ(A)  Ψ(B); thus Ψ′(Ψ(A)) ∗ Ψ′(Ψ(B)), as desired.
Continuity: Let A ∈ A∗ and let (Bi) ∈ (A∗)N be convergent. Define B ≡ limBi.
Clearly, (Ψ∗(Bi)) is convergent with Ψ∗(B) = lim Ψ∗(Bi).
If for each i ∈ N, Bi %∗ A, then for each i ∈ N, Ψ∗(Bi) % Ψ∗(A). Since % is
continuous, Ψ∗(B) % Ψ∗(A); thus B %∗ A, as desired.
If for each i ∈ N, A %∗ Bi, then by a similar argument A %∗ B, as desired.
3+-AS: Let A ∈ A∗ be an atom. Then Ψ∗(A) ∈ A is an atom. Since % satisfies 3-AS,
there are
(i) pairwise-disjoint B ⊆ (↓ Ψ∗(A)), and
(ii) B1,B2,B3 ⊆ B′ partitioning B,
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (∪Bi)  Ψ∗(A).
63
Define B′ ⊆ A′ and B∗ ⊆ A∗ by:
B′ ≡ {Ψ(B)|B ∈ B}
B∗ ≡ {Ψ′(B)|B ∈ B′}
Similarly, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define B′i ⊆ A′ and B∗i ⊆ A∗ by:
B′i ≡ {Ψ(B)|B ∈ Bi}
B∗i ≡ {Ψ′(B)|B ∈ B′i}
Since Ψ preserves likelihood and disjoint pairs,
(i) B′ ⊆ (↓ Ψ∗(A)),
(ii) B′ is pairwise-disjoint, and
(iii) B′1,B′2,B′3 ⊆ B′ partition B′.
Moreover, let i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We first claim Bi is finite or countably infinite. Indeed, there
is no non-decreasing sequence (Bj) ∈ (Bi)N; else since Bi is pairwise-disjoint, ∅ = limBj,
so by continuity ∅ % B1, contradicting B1 ∈ (↓ Ψ∗(A)). If Bi is not finite, then we
can construct (Bj) ∈ (B′i)N by iteratively taking the most-likely remaining event as in
Step 2, and since Bi is pairwise-disjoint, ∅ = limBj. In this case, {Bj} = Bi; else
there is B ∈ Bi\{Bj}, and by construction, for each j ∈ N, Bj % B, so by continuity
∅ = limBj % B, contradicting B ∈ (↓ Ψ∗(A)). Thus Bi is finite or countably infinite, as
desired.
Label the members of Bi by {B1, B2, ..., Bj, ...} = {Bj}j∈J , where J ⊆ N may or
may not be finite. For each j ∈ J , define B′j ≡ Ψ(Bj), define Cj ≡ ∪k≤jBk, and define
C ′j ≡ ∪k≤jΨ(Bk).
We claim that for each j ∈ J , Cj ∼ C ′j, which we prove by induction through an
argument similar to that in Step 4. For the base step, since Ψ preserves likelihood,
C1 ∼ C ′1. For the inductive step, assume that Cj ∼ C ′j. Since Ψ preserves likelihood,
Bj+1 ∼ B′j+1. By construction, Cj and Bj+1 are disjoint, so by the Domination Lemma,
Cj+1 % C ′j+1. By construction, C ′j and B′j+1 are disjoint, so by the Domination Lemma,
C ′j+1 % Cj+1. Thus Cj+1 ∼ C ′j+1, as desired.
If J is finite, then ∪Bi = C|J | and ∪B′i = C ′|J |, so ∪Bi ∼ ∪B′i. Otherwise, Bi = limCj
and B′i = limC ′j, so by the Limit-Order Lemma twice, ∪Bi ∼ ∪B′i. Thus ∪B′i  Ψ∗(A).
By definition of Ψ′, since Ψ′ preserves disjoint pairs, and since Ψ′ is the inverse of Ψ∗,
it follows from the above properties of B′,B′1,B′2,B′3 that:
(i) B∗ ⊆ (↓ A),
(ii) B∗ is pairwise-disjoint,
(iii) B∗1,B∗2,B∗3 ⊆ B′ partition B∗, and
(iv) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∪B∗i ∗ A,
as desired.
Catalogued: To see that (S∗,A∗,%∗) is catalogued, simply take S⊕ = I. 
◦ Step 7: (S∗,A∗,%∗) has representation µ∗ ∈Mσ(A∗) with the desired properties.
Since (S∗,A∗,%∗) is a catalogued qualitative probability space satisfying continuity
and 3+-AS, this is immediate from Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
◦ Step 8: (S,A,%) has unique representation µ ∈Mσ(A) with the desired properties.
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For each A ∈ A∗, define µ(Ψ∗(A)) ≡ µ∗(A). For each i ∈ I and each B ⊆ Ai, define
µ(B) ≡ µ(Ai) if B ∼ Ai and define µ(B) ≡ 0 otherwise. It is straightforward to complete
the definition of µ to be a σ-measure and to verify its properties. 
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